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Chapter 3 
Vietnam and the Pax Americana 
A Genealogy of the "New World Order" 
Swerve me? ye cannot swerve me, else ye swerve yourselves! man has ye 
there. Swerve me? The path to my fixed purpose is laid with iron rails, 
whereon my soul is grooved to run. Over unsounded gorges, through 
the rifled hearts of mountains, under torrents' beds, unerringly I rush! 
Naught's an obstacle, naught's an angle to the iron way! 
— C A P T A I N A H A B , in Herman Melville, Moby-Dick 
Robert "Blowtorch" Komer, chief of COORDS, spook anagram for Other 
War, pacification, another word for war. If Wil l iam Blake had "reported" 
to him that he'd seen angels in the trees, Komer would have tried to talk 
him out of it . Failing there, he'd have ordered defoliation. 
— M I C H A E L  Dispatches 
" K i l l Nam," said Lieutenant Calley. He pointed his weapon at the earth, 
burned twenty quick rounds. " K i l l i t , " he said. He reloaded and shot the 
grass and a palm tree and then the earth again. "Grease the place," he 
said. " K i l l i t . " — T I M O ' B R I E N , In the Lake of the Woods 
Introduction: The Question of 
the American Cultural Memory 
A l l too many "progressive" academics are now affirming that the vari-
ous emancipatory discursive practices precipitated by the Vietnam War 
have established a revisionary cultural momentum that promises to af-
fect the sociopolitical site of American, indeed of global, being in a 
decisive way. This, i t would seem, is suggested by the significant trans-
formation of the canonical curriculum accomplished in the academy and 
other institutions of cultural production since 1968. It is also suggested 
by the increasingly vocal representation of this transformation by the 
cultural and political Right as a usurpation of power by a radical Left, 
one that has imposed a totalitarian discourse of political correctness — 
a new McCarthyism in reverse. Yet one cannot escape the feeling in 
1999 that the emancipatory "postmodern" discursive practices precip-
itated during and by the occasion of the Vietnam decade to resist the 
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evils of racism, patriarchy, and, especially, postcolonial colonialism have 
reached an impasse, if not an exhausted dead end. Despite the surface 
optimism in the academy, this feeling of exhaustion, in fact, pervades 
the intellectual climate of North America as a paralyzing virus. Its signs 
are discoverable everywhere. One finds it in the futile predictability — 
the indifference — of a differential "cultural critique" of the so-called 
postmodern agencies of knowledge transmission and in its loud mute-
ness about the global cultural and sociopolitical conditions precipitated 
by the West's representation of the events of 1989-90 in China, and in 
Eastern and Central Europe and the Soviet Union, not simply as the "fall 
of communism," but even more triumphantly as the "end of history" 
and the "advent of the New World Order." This sense of exhaustion 
can even be discerned in the very "emancipatory" cultural and politi-
cal practices — the so-called multicultural initiative at both the domestic 
and international sites — that these agents of countercultural produc-
tion have in large part enabled. And this impasse, in turn, has instigated 
a disabling reorientation of critique on the part of many of the most vi-
tally provocative Left critics writing in America today, more  
a refocusing that, on the basis of the "decline of the nation-state" and 
the emergence of transnational capitalism, would abandon the site of 
"America" as a determining planetary force in favor of a global perspec-
tive in which "America" as a national culture is represented maximally 
as an outmoded or minimally as a subordinate  
The rhetoric usually employed to articulate this feeling of impasse 
circulates around the terms "institutionalization" or "professionaliza-
 The original revolutionary impulse that would have undermined 
the American discourse of hegemony, it is claimed, has been co-opted 
and pacified by its success: its (self-)incorporation in the discourse of 
"America," by which I mean the liberal humanist discourse of a nation-
state whose "truths" have become planetary. This thesis is superficially 
true. But in its theoretical abstraction, it is symptomatic of precisely 
what theory in its historical origins discovered to be one of the most 
powerful political strategies of the discourse of hegemony. It displaces 
historically specific conflict, where imbalances of power — injustices — 
determine praxis, to the rarefied and free-floating space of liberal de-
bate, where all positions are equal: to a context that enables this kind of 
reformist thinking to accommodate resistant voices. 
In this chapter, I want to retrieve the virtually forgotten historical ori-
gins of what has come to be called postmodern theory. This, not simply 
for its own sake, but also to suggest the one needful thing capable of 
breaking through the impasse into which the emancipatory discursive 
practices enabled by postmodern theory have become mired. I mean the 
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retrieval of the Vietnam War as event from the oblivion to which the 
custodians of the American Cultural Memory have systematically rel-
egated it and consequently the need to rethink the critical imperatives 
this historically specific war — it cannot be represented as simply any 
  has disclosed about the post-Enlightenment American/Occidental 
episteme. 
The very adversarial discourse the contradictions of this war in large 
part enabled has, however inadvertently, become complicitous with the 
dominant culture's amnesiac strategy. If a reconstellation of American 
criticism to the global scene is an imperative of the contemporary occa-
sion, as, of course, it is, such a reconstellation must always keep in mind 
the determinative role that the idea of "America"  especially the myth 
of American exceptionalism — continues to play in the formulation and 
disposition of the cultural and sociopolitical issues of this expanded 
space: Kosovo, for example. The failure to do so, I submit, constitutes 
a disabling blindness to the essence of the globalization of the ques-
tions that confront postmodern men and women in the "post"-Cold 
War era. The impasse confronting emancipatory discursive practices in 
the aftermath of the "revolutions" in Eastern and Central Europe and 
the Soviet Union and the apparently decisive triumph over a despotic 
state in the Gulf War is not so much symptomatic of the anachronistic 
status to which these discursive practices have been relegated by their 
institutionalization. It is primarily the result of their insistent failure to 
think the radically critical imperatives spontaneously disclosed by the 
 of the exceptionalist discourse of "America" in the de-
cade of the Vietnam War. I mean by this the hegemonic discourse that, 
since the Puritans' "errand in the wilderness," has   right 
up to the   taken upon itself the "burden" of fulfilling the plan-
etary promise ordained by the Logos of God or by History, the promise, 
of course, betrayed by a "decadent" Old World. 
This blindness becomes tellingly ironic if, as its unrelenting force and 
massive scope demand, one reads the dominant culture's multifaceted ef-
fort to bury Vietnam as a subliminal recognition that its ghost continues 
to haunt the American Cultural Memory in the post-Cold War era. 
The Forgetting of Vietnam and the Hegemony of 
the End-of-History Discourse in the Post-Cold War Era 
What, after the revelatory event of Vietnam, should be astonishing 
to anyone living in the present historical conjuncture is the enormous 
power of the  War discourse. This, as I have reiterated, 
is the discourse, common to both cultural conservatives and  
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that represents the successful "revolutions" against Stalinist commu-
nism first in the Eastern Bloc and then in the Soviet Union itself, the 
brutal suppression of the uprising in Tianamnen Square by the Old 
Guard communist regime, and the surgically executed military victory 
against Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War as the "fall of communism," 
that is, as the irreversible manifestation of the universal illegitimacy of 
the founding principles of socialism. Conversely, and more tellingly, it 
is the discourse that represents the global events of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s as a decisive manifestation of the universal legitimacy of 
the idea of American democracy. I am referring to the theory, most 
starkly exemplified by Francis Fukuyama's Hegelian interpretation of 
these events, that interprets the end of the Cold War as the culmination 
and fulfillment of a dialectical historical process that has precipitated 
liberal capitalist democracy as the "absolute" or planetary form of gov-
ernment and, in so doing, has brought the "developmental" dialectical 
economy of historical differentiation to its noncontradictory fulfillment 
and end in a totalized and identical self-present world  Despite a 
certain toning down of the triumphalist rhetoric compelled by the on-
going civil/racial strife in Bosnia, Kosovo, and other parts of the world 
and the reassessment of the "decisive" defeat of Saddam Hussein, this 
triumphalist American representation of the contemporary post-Cold 
War occasion continues to determine the content and parameters of cul-
tural and sociopolitical discourse and practice not simply in the West 
but everywhere in the world. (It is a mistake to conclude, as too many 
on the Left have, that the continuing strife these post-Gulf War events 
reflect has effectively delegitimated the end-of-history discourse. The 
dominant culture's representation of America's global role has not aban-
doned this triumphalist vision. Rather, as in the case of Richard Ha ass's 
The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States after the Cold War, it has ac-
commodated these events to America's perennial, historically ordained, 
exceptionalist  As such, this triumphalist representation has 
effectively obliterated or accommodated any differential event the con-
tradictory force of which might legitimate a resistant impulse, not least 
the history of the Vietnam War. In so doing, it has also empowered it-
self to demonize any such resistant impulse as "political correctness." 
Symptomatic of the inordinate power of this global post-Cold War dis-
course (and of the inadequacy, if not obsolescence, of the traditional 
and even postmodern Left-oriented problematics) is the dearth of sig-
nificant challenges to this representation of the end of the Cold War 
as the end of history. The principal spokespersons of the various op-
positional discourses that have emerged in the academic marketplace 
as "victors" over deconstruction and other discourses focusing on the 
Spanos: Vietnam and the Pax Americana:
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ontological question have not only largely ignored this epochal end-of-
history thesis. They have also paid little attention to the practices it has 
enabled: the American invasion of Panama, the Gulf War, the "relief" 
of Somalia (Operation Hope), the intervention in Hait i , and, more re-
cently, the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo (though not, for example, 
in Rwanda) and, in the name of securing the world from the threat of 
"weapons of mass destruction," once again in Iraq. Most of these dis-
courses (they include not only the New Historicism, critical genealogy, 
and the various neo-Marxisms that derive from the "critical theory" 
of the Frankfurt School and from the interpretation of postmodernism 
as the cultural logic of late capitalism, but also much of black criti-
cism, feminist criticism, and even postcolonial criticism) practice their 
adversarial criticism as if this triumphalist end-of-history discourse did 
not exist or is too trivial to warrant serious attention. They seem to 
have forgotten their provenance in the Vietnam War, in the spectacle 
of an Occidental state practicing something like genocide (by means, in 
part, of an army largely conscripted from its oppressed minorities) in 
the name of the fundamental principles of liberal democracy (the "free 
world") . 
How, then, is one to account for the present cultural power of 
this triumphalist discourse of the New World Order? Why is it that 
an adversarial postmodernist discourse instigated in large part by the 
unequivocal exposure during the Vietnam War of the contradictory im-
perial violence inhering in the "benign" political discourse of Occidental 
  what Foucault has called "the regime of   has been 
reduced to virtual silence in the face of the reaffirmation of America's 
global errand in the aftermath of the Cold War? The Vietnam War bore 
witness to the decisive self-destruction of the logical economy propelling 
the American intervention in Vietnam, a self-destruction synecdochically 
enacted in the mad rationality of the American military officer who 
made history by declaring to his interlocutor that "we had to destroy 
Ben Tre in order to save  Why, then, do the adversarial discourses 
that emerged from the rubble of this self-destruction seem now without 
recourse to confront the dominant liberal capitalist culture's represen-
tation of the end of the Cold War as the advent of the New World 
Order, which is to say, as the Pax Americana} Why, on the twentieth 
anniversary of the fall of Saigon, does this oppositional discourse tacitly 
acknowledge the culture industry's decisive pronouncement that Robert 
McNamara's strategically timed memoirs as secretary of defense in the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations constitute the definitive and final 
resolving act of the Vietnam War? 
In this confessional book, after all, McNamara simply reiterates the 
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long-standing "liberal" rationalization of the war: that he and his gov-
ernmental colleagues made "an error not of [American] values and 
intention but of judgment and  And by thus containing 
critique to such damage-control management he vindicates the idea of 
 More important, the discourse he employs to confess his 
and his Pentagon colleagues' "mistakes" remains the same terribly banal 
"problem-solving" American discourse that destroyed Vietnam. Despite 
the fact that his very account of the failure to "win the hearts and 
minds" of the Vietnamese people to American values symptomatically 
exposes to view the life-destroying inhumanity of this banal instrumen-
tal reasoning, this "educated" McNamara is incapable of seeing it . In 
his recollection of General Westmoreland's and the Joint Chiefs' fateful 
argument for escalating the war in  for example, he writes: 
Although I questioned [their] assumptions during my meetings 
with Westy and his staff, the discussions proved superficial. Look-
ing back, I clearly erred by not forcing — then or later, in Saigon 
or Washington — a knock-down, drag-out debate over the loose 
assumptions, unasked questions, and thin analyses underlying our 
military strategy in Vietnam. I spent twenty years as a manager, 
identifying problems and forcing organizations — often against 
their wi l l — to think deeply and realistically about alternative 
courses of action and their consequences. I doubt I wi l l ever fully 
understand why I did not do so  
I am not presumptuous enough to assert that the questions I have 
asked above are amenable to easy answers, let alone to proffer them 
here. But I do believe that a beginning in this direction is possible on the 
basis of what I take to be a  — I am tempted to say "studied" — 
unthought in the various practice-oriented emancipatory discourses that 
are now subsumed under the term "postmodern." It is, I suggest, an un-
thought the thinking of which would go far to explain their inadequacy 
to the task of resistance, to say nothing about their contribution to a 
positive alternative to the dominant idea of the polis. But to inaugurate 
a thinking of this crucial unthought that haunts these adversarial dis-
courses, a thinking, that is, which is adequate to the conditions of the 
present global occasion, w i l l require a detour into the productive tech-
nology of forgetting endemic to the American Cultural Memory as this 
amnesiac technology has worked itself out in the twenty years following 
the fall of Saigon. 
No war in American history, wi th the possible exception of the Civil 
War, has affected the collective American psyche so profoundly and 
for so long as the Vietnam War. Though World War I and especially 
Spanos: Vietnam and the Pax Americana:
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World War I I were far wider in scope and larger in scale, brought far 
more of the American population directly in contact with war, and 
killed and wounded far more American youth, the Vietnam War has 
remained a national obsession. Some indefinable "thing" about the jus-
tification and conduct of the war — something having to do with the 
name "America" — instigated a national anxiety, a collective psychic 
trauma (from the Greek trauma: wound) that has become the spectral 
"measure" of the intelligibility of the domestic and international cultural 
and sociopolitical discourse and practice of the United States, regard-
less of the historically specific context, since the 1960s and especially 
the Tet Offensive of 1968. This is clearly suggested by the continu-
ing outpour of histories, documentaries, biographies, autobiographical 
reminiscences, memoirs, films, fiction, videos, even comic books specif-
ically about the war and by the repeated official and media-sponsored 
stagings of national rituals of  most notably what Sac-
van Bercovitch would call American  I t is   and more 
insidiously — suggested by the ever-extending capillary saturation of 
this obsession into adjacent and even remote spaces of cultural pro-
duction. I am referring, for example, to the concerted and increasingly 
widespread and strident representation of the multicultural initiative in 
American colleges and universities by the National Association of Schol-
ars and other conservative intellectuals as a "new McCarthyism of the 
Left"** and to the unrelenting effort of both conservative and liberal 
humanists alike to demonstrate the causal relation between Paul de 
Man's and Mar t in Heidegger's Nazi politics and the "antihumanism" 
of their "post-Enlightenment" philosophical  Given the scope 
and depth of this national anxiety and the manifestly massive and 
multisituated need to allay by reifying its indeterminate "object" — its 
spectral presence, as Derrida might say of this revenant — it is quite 
clear that the American Cultural Memory has been intent since the end 
of the war on forgetting/repressing a momentous disclosure about its 
collective self. What precisely it was that thus showed itself and would 
be forgotten — what continues strangely to haunt the period-oriented 
American Cultural Memory, to visit its perennial visitor, as it were — 
wi l l be a fundamental purpose of this chapter to think. 
I could, of course, name this specter at the beginning, but to represent 
" i t " as such an abstraction would attenuate the profoundly dislocat-
ing ontological, cultural, and sociopolitical implications of the United 
States's intervention and conduct of the war in Vietnam for its historical, 
including present, self-representation. I choose, therefore, to undertake 
a detour within this detour into the Vietnam War guided by the manifest 
anxiety afflicting the American Cultural Memory. Given the importance 
Journal of Transnational American Studies, 6(1) (2015)
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of discovering the repressed origin that nevertheless continues to haunt 
the present post-Cold War occasion, it seems to me preferable as a 
provisional imperative of such a genealogy to retrieve the historically 
specific symbolic forms in which this national obsession to forget Viet-
nam has manifested itself since the end of the Vietnam War. Attentive 
to this national anxiety as a forestructure, we must, in Heidegger's 
terms, first enter the hermeneutic circle in the spirit of "care"  
"primordially and wholly." 
What we discover, in thus retrieving the history of the American 
culture industry's representation of the Vietnam War — and by "cul-
ture industry" I mean not simply the media, but also the institutions 
of knowledge production — is that this history has constituted a pro-
cess of remembering that, in fact, has been a willful forgetting of the 
actualities of the war. And it takes broadly four different but increas-
ingly assertive forms according to the chronological and psychological 
distance from the defeat of the United States, an assertiveness enforced 
by a series of historical events determined and/or represented in some 
fundamental ways by this recollective wi l l to forget. I t is, of course, im-
possible to do justice to the massive textual archive that, after a decade 
of silence, has been produced since the dedication of the Vietnam Vet-
erans Memorial in 1982 for this purpose of forgetting Vietnam or, to 
anticipate the metaphorics associated with this recuperative project, of 
"healing the wound" in the American collective consciousness "inflicted 
by" the war. (In its ritualized memorial character, the Vietnam Veterans 
Memorial is itself a crucial instance, indeed, the inaugural act, of this 
sustained recuperative  That larger genealogy must wait for an-
other  Here it w i l l have to suffice to invoke a small number of 
synecdochic texts from an immense stock of cultural capital that have 
been decisive in the virtually undeviating effort of the American Cul-
ture Memory to renarrativize the recalcitrant event of the Vietnam War: 
to bring the contradictory history of this first postmodern war to its 
 
The first phase of this recuperative national project, in fact, preceded 
the end of the war, but indirectly acknowledged imminent defeat. I t was 
characterized by a belated but proleptic effort to rehabilitate the shat-
tered image of the American military mission by placing the blame for 
its failure to achieve its announced goal on the alleged complicity be-
tween the media, which by 1968 had in some degree turned against 
the war, and the protest movement in the United States. This inaugu-
ral phase is epitomized by John Wayne's Green Berets, produced, wi th 
the support of the Lyndon Baines Johnson faltering presidency, in  
the year, we might say, of the apparition of the specter that was increas-
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 to haunt the discourse of "America" in the following years. This 
epochally imagined American jeremiad is fundamentally about represen-
tation. At a briefing staged for journalists by the Green Berets, Colonel 
Kirby (Wayne), the pioneer-like commander of a detachment of Green 
Berets, who has been assigned to establish and hold a base camp in 
the heart of enemy territory in Vietnam, challenges a prestigious an-
tiwar reporter for a powerful American newspaper, Beckworth (David 
Jansen), to reconsider his typically negative representations of the Amer-
ican Mission in the Vietnam wilderness. He tells Beckworth that the 
antiwar sentiments he transmits to the American public are grounded 
in hearsay; that, like the liberal American press he represents, he is, in 
fact, the unwitting dupe of the ideological fictions of a dangerously ex-
panding subversive element in the United States. And he concludes by 
telling the reporter that if he were there in Vietnam to see and experience 
the "real" war for himself, he would realize the damage his ideologically 
mediated antiwar writing was doing to the noble national cause of truth, 
freedom, and human dignity in the "free world's" struggle in behalf of 
the threatened Vietnamese people against a savage enemy who was him-
self the puppet of the Soviet U n i o n . B e c k w o r t h is thus "compelled" by 
Kirby's "reasonable" appeal to this hegemonic discourse to accompany 
the colonel's Green Berets to Vietnam. Thus interpellated by Amer-
ica's call, Beckworth experiences "immediately" both the cowardly and 
grotesque brutalities of the Asiatic hordes, especially against the inno-
cent Montagnards (which include the raping of their children), and the 
pioneer-like self-reliance, the courage, and the selflessness of the Green 
Berets (and their South Vietnamese allies): their Alamo-like defense of 
the base camp and their winning of the hearts and minds of the Viet-
namese  Beckworth thus undergoes a conversion to the 
"Truth." This "immediate" Truth is, of course, an ideological represen-
tation intended to rehabilitate the shattered official image of America's 
allegedly benign mission in Southeast Asia. I t simply superimposes the 
American culture industry's  narrative of America's rep-
resentation of the American frontiersman's violence against the Other 
as a heroic struggle against a savage enemy, who diabolically impedes 
the providentially ordained mission to settle the "virgin land," on the 
complex and recalcitrantly differential reality of the people's war be-
ing fought in Vietnam: "Fort Dodge," as the base camp is named in 
the film, on the Vietnamese "wilderness."** By way of this perennial 
American distrust of mediation, this commitment to "immediate" (em-
pirical) experience, what was in reality a brutally aggressive act on the 
part of the United States is represented by the American culture industry 
as the enactment of the perennial and historically validated disinterested 
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goodwill of America toward a distant people suffering under the yoke 
of oppression. 
The second phase of this amnesiac representational history was char-
acterized by a (very audible) national silence about the war that had 
just been lost, especially about the returning veterans. Unlike the t r i -
umphant veterans of World War I I , the veterans of the Vietnam War 
were ignored by the American culture industry. In the resonant rheto-
ric Thomas Pynchon uses to trace the genealogy of Protestant/capitalist 
American modernity back to the Puritan errand in the wilderness, they 
were "preterited" or "passed over." But this preterition of the Viet-
nam veteran was in effect a symptomatic representation by the National 
Memory that rendered them scapegoats for the American defeat in Viet-
nam. As late as 1977, Philip Caputo recalls and laments the senselessly 
heroic death of a Marine comrade in arms in the bitterly ironic terms of 
Wilfred Owen's anti-Horatian (and -imperial) "Dulce et Decorum Est": 
You died for the man you tried to save, and you died pro patria. I t 
was not altogether sweet and fitting, your death, but I 'm sure you 
died believing it was pro patria. You were faithful. Your country is 
not. As I write this, eleven years after your death, the country for 
which you died wishes to forget the war in which you died. Its very 
name is a curse. There are no monuments to its heroes, no stat-
ues in small-town squares and city parks, no plaques, nor public 
wreaths, nor memorials. For plaques and wreaths and memorials 
are reminders, and they would make it harder for your country to 
sink into the amnesia for which it longs. It wished to forget and i t 
has forgotten. But there are a few of us who remember because of 
the small things that made us love you.*' 
This second phase, which is historically represented by its non-
representation, initiated a collective strategy of rationalization by the 
American Cultural Memory that became more clearly differentiated 
and increasingly forceful after the dedication of the Vietnam Veterans 
Memorial in 1982: in the third and especially the fourth, post-Cold 
War, phase. The silence of this second phase, that is, implicitly intimated 
the betrayal of the principles informing "America" by those conducting 
and fighting the war in Vietnam. In doing so, i t foreclosed any question, 
despite persuasive marginal voices both in the United States and abroad, 
like those of Noam Chomsky, Mart in Luther King, Jean-Paul Sartre, and 
Bertrand Russell, about the culpability of the very principles themselves. 
The third and decisive phase was initiated during the Reagan ad-
ministration and was concurrent wi th the massive initiative to regain 
a culturally and politically conservative — and militaristic — national 
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consensus  behalf of its imperial interventions  Granada,  Sal-
vador, Nicaragua, and the Middle East, in behalf, that is, of the Cold 
 against Soviet communism.  Reagan's rhetoric, this was the ini-
tiative that would "build the city on the h i l l " against the global threat 
of "the evil empire." Not incidentally, this third phase was also con-
current wi th the highly visible "reform" initiative in higher education 
inaugurated by Harvard University in 1978 wi th the publication of the 
"Harvard Core Curriculum Report" and promulgated by the Reagan 
administration under the direction of Wil l iam J. Bennett, director of the 
National Endowment for the Humanities and later secretary of educa-
tion. I am referring to the initiative that was intended to recuperate the 
core curriculum, which, according to the representation proffered by the 
Harvard faculty (and nationally mediatized by the American press), was 
"eroded" by the "promiscuous" demands of students, women, blacks, 
and ethnic minorities in the 1960s, but which, in effect, was intended 
to accommodate the gains made by the civil rights and women's move-
ment to the hegemonic center. That is to say, it was in reality intended 
to forget the complicity of the American colleges and universities wi th 
the State's intervention and conduct of the war in  
Specifically, this third phase of the renarrativizing process was inau-
gurated when the preterited veterans began to demand recognition for 
the sacrificial services they had performed in behalf of their country's 
call, a momentum that culminated in the dedication of the Vietnam Vet-
erans Memorial in Washington,  in 1982. This national ceremony 
was accompanied by a deluge of retrospective cultural production — 
movies, fiction, video documentaries, histories, autobiographical ac-
counts of veterans' experiences — that in a virtually monolithic way 
represented the  American occasion as a time for reconcili-
ation, a sentiment expressed in terms of the pervasive and resonant (but 
never rigorously interpreted) metaphor of the national need to "heal the 
wound." What, in the historical context, this ubiquitous trope meant 
  at the conscious   to the American public was the na-
tional imperative to rehabilitate the dignity and honor of the  and 
ostracized Vietnam veteran and to reintegrate him [sic] into American 
society. A t a deeper ideological level this trope was a hegemonic (jeremi-
adic) call of the American public to itself to reconcile the sociopolitical 
divisions precipitated by the war in behalf of the recuperation of the 
national consensus. This meant, in effect, a call to free itself from the se-
ductive discourse of a certain social constituency that, in its continuing 
contestation of the rationale and conduct of the war, exacerbated the 
festering laceration inflicted on the American body politic. More accu-
rately, i t meant a call to recuperate the health of the American  — 
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 traditional collective   that had been shattered by 
a defeat largely caused by this same vocal minority that had resisted the 
war, that is, had prevented America from winning it. 
This third phase of the recuperative representational process can be 
broadly subdivided into two moments. The  includes the letters 
home {Dear America: Letters from Vietnam [1985]); the oral histories 
{Everything We Had [1981], To Bear Any Burden [1985], Nam [1981], 
and Bloods [1984]); the autobiographies (John Caputo's A Rumor of 
War [1977] and Ron Kovic's Born on the Fourth of  [1976]); and 
the spate of Hollywood films initiated by The Deerhunter (1978) and 
Coming Home (1978) but epitomized ideologically by the Rambo t r i l -
ogy (1982, 1984, 1988) (and its multiple offshoots having their point of 
departure in the M I A issue).** 
Rehearsing John Wayne's fraudulent distinction between a "false" 
(mediated) protestant representation of America's involvement in Viet-
nam and a "true" representation based on being there, the first moment 
of this third phase is epitomized by  Santoli's best-selling oral history 
of the Vietnam War, Everything We Had. I t takes the form of a prefa-
torial direct address to an implied American public that was perilously 
confused about its national identity and invokes an unmediated (objec-
tive) "reality" — seeing the Vietnam War "as it was": wi th the eyes 
of the "thirty-three [representative] soldiers who fought i t " — against 
a "prevailing" mediated (and ideologically negative) representation that 
could only exacerbate the collective psychic "wound": 
In our book we hope you w i l l see what we saw, do what we did, 
feel what we felt. Unti l the broader public fully comprehends the 
nameless soldier, once an image on your television screen, the na-
tion's resolution of the experience called Vietnam wi l l be less than 
adequate. 
The American people have never heard in depth from the sol-
diers themselves the complicated psychic and physical realities of 
what they went through in Vietnam.** 
In implicitly positing the "individual's" eyewitness as more authentic 
than any mediated standpoint, the texts of this group, like John Wayne's 
The Green Berets, reduces this war — the Vietnam War — to war-in-
general, and "the raw experiences" of the American soldier fighting in 
this war to the timeless and noble agony of the universal soldier. I t thus 
displaces the disturbing current focus on the United States's historically 
specific cultural and sociopolitical conduct of the Vietnam War (and on 
the dislocating psychological consequence of its defeat by a Third World 
people) in favor of a represented focus that celebrates the heroism and 
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  the "tr iumph"  of the (American) human spirit in the face of 
the carnage of war, which, in this internalized discourse, is referred to as 
"the supreme test of manhood." Nor should it be overlooked that this 
triumph of the individual is precisely the characteristic that, according 
to a fundamental motif of this hegemonic discourse — one that is also 
exploited in The Green Berets — distinguishes the "American" (Occi-
dental) self from the "Asiatic hordes." This, finally, is the ideological 
agenda of the numerous "letters home" and "oral histories" that would 
"heal the wound" by substituting the American soldier's immediate ac-
count of the war for representations that were "adulterated" by (Left) 
politics. As Santoli puts this ideologically compelled internalization and 
universalization of specific American political history in the last of the 
three epigraphs of Everything We Had — without consciousness of the 
contradiction of quoting an Oriental: 
Though it be broken — 
Broken   still it's  
The moon on the water. 
— Chosu 
The second subdivision of this third phase — epitomized by Sylvester 
Stallone's Rambo   repeats the representational imperative "to 
see what we saw,...  what we felt" against the mediated represen-
tations of the ideologically radical Left. The difference between this 
representation and that of the earlier oral and epistolary histories (be-
sides the fact that it constitutes a self-parody of the latter) is, however, 
that its recuperative narrative strategy is bolder. It is not accidental 
that this more assertive recuperative initiative was coincidental wi th the 
emergence of a strident reactionary cultural discourse, represented by 
Allan Bloom, Roger Kimball, David Lehman, Dinesh D'Souza, Hi l ton 
Kramer, and the members of the National Association of Scholars, that 
represented the institutions of higher learning in   indeed, the 
cultural agencies of knowledge production and transmission at large — 
not simply as a process of randomizing the curriculum as the "Harvard 
Core Curriculum Report" had alleged in 1978, but as having been taken 
over by now "tenured radicals" of the 1960s (white postmodernists, 
feminists, and blacks) who resisted the Vietnam War. Unlike the univer-
salist accounts projected by the earlier oral histories that individualized 
and universalized the war, this revisionary discourse represents the medi-
ated accounts of the Vietnam War as the primary cause of the American 
defeat in Vietnam. 
The subversive protest movement in America, according to this 
emboldened representation, succeeded in passing off its ideologically 
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grounded representations of the Vietnam War as the truth of this his-
tory not only to determinative segments of the political and military 
leadership of America, but also to the American public at large. It thus 
established juridical, sociopolitical, and military constraints that made 
it impossible for the American soldiers to win the war. That is to say, 
it precluded the fulfillment of "America's" global mission to resist the 
insidious imperial machinations of the evil empire in the name of the 
free world. 
The Rambo trilogy, for example, begins (Rambo: First Blood) with 
the return of a disillusioned Green Beret veteran to "the wor ld" (in 
the form of a typical small American town in the Pacific Northwest). 
The film establishes the viewer's sympathy for this alienated and bitter 
Rambo at the outset by representing his return as a visit to the parents 
of his dead black comrade (a representation, not incidentally, that turns 
the black soldier into a symbol of the betrayed American ideal). What 
he discovers instead is that the world not only does not want his like 
in its midst, but, when he insists on his rights as an American citizen, 
treats him as if he were a psychopathic killer, spawned by the Vietnam 
War, who threatens the order and tranquillity of this typical American 
community. In the process of depicting Rambo's cunningly ferocious re-
sistance against an America turned into a Vietnam in reverse, the film 
transforms the Green Beret (the American warrior of John F. Kennedy's 
"New Frontier") into a cross between a technologized Natty Bumppo 
and a Vietcong guerrilla. I t thus draws the emergent revisionary conclu-
sion that America lost the war not because its brutal conduct destroyed 
the credibility of its justification for intervening in Vietnam, but because 
John Rambo and his valiant and ultrapatriotic comrades in arms against 
the global aspirations of communism were not allowed by the misled, 
indeed, corrupted, deputies of the American body politic to win it.** 
The trilogy then passes through a reductive melodramatic narrative, 
Rambo: First Blood II, reminiscent of the western captivity film, which 
represents the hero as the lone and silent American frontiersman who 
has learned his deadly craft from his savage enemy, a representation 
whose genealogy extends from dime westerns of the  back through 
Francis Parkman's histories of the French and Indian Wars to Judge 
James Hall's "The Indian Hater"  and Robert Montgomery Bird's 
Nick of the Woods  This film, playing on the question of the 
 that the Reagan presidency inflated into a national political issue 
in the 1980s, depicts Rambo's single-handed (and ferociously single-
minded) effort to rescue some American prisoners in Vietnam. In the 
process, i t reiterates the perennial official — and calculatedly staged — 
Cold War representation of the Vietnamese insurgency as the narrative 
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project of an underdeveloped and inferior race of puppets utterly con-
trolled by strings emanating from Moscow. The trilogy, which from the 
outset assumes the "negatively interpellated" point of view of the sav-
ing remnant, ends with the reaffirmation of a national consensus in the 
struggle of a small minority in the United States against a massive do-
mestic momentum that would betray "America" and against the "evil 
empire" (and its "domino" strategy) now waging war in Afghanistan(!) 
(Rambo: First Blood 111). 
This revisionist ideological initiative was not restricted to the simu-
lacral productions of Hollywood. I t was, in fact, the essential project 
of the culture industry at large. This is emphatically suggested by 
such immensely popular "documentaries" as A l Santoli's To Bear Any 
Burden (1985), which, in collecting the personal "testimony" about 
the "Vietnam War and its aftermath" of "Americans and Southeast 
Asians" "who remember,"** duplicates this melodramatically imagined 
transformation of a recuperative ideology of reconciliation (i.e., ac-
commodation) to a more aggressive attack against the countermemory. 
"After the publication of Everything We Had," Santoli writes in his 
preface, " I realized that the recognition given to it and to Vietnam veter-
ans in general is only one step in our coming to terms with the Vietnam 
trauma. The larger story is more than one of combat by American sol-
diers in Vietnam, or one that ends wi th America's direct involvement 
there. I t seemed necessary to take a look at the revolution that pre-
ceded America's involvement, as well as the effects of the Communist 
victory in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos" (BAB, xv i -xvi i ) . The "truth" 
to which this "objective" (retrospective) look bears witness is suggested 
in a paragraph preceding this one: " I did not want to see the Commu-
nists succeed or the lives of my friends wasted. But with no mandate for 
victory, and a senseless obsession with body-counts, I felt that our lives 
and ideals meant nothing. We were just cold statistics in Washington's 
political computers. Everything I ever believed in was turned upside 
down" (BAB, xvi). Hidden behind Santoli's appeal to a cross-section 
of eyewitness accounts is a self-confirming future-anterior selective pro-
cess ("the effects of the Communist victory in Vietnam") as recounted 
by "a larger community of veterans" (BAB, xvii) — not only Ameri-
cans (soldiers, journalists, diplomats, relief workers), but Cambodian 
refugees and former Vietnamese insurgents themselves. I t is, in other 
words, a process that, like the Rambo trilogy, articulates a narrative that 
would bring a war that refused to end to decisive closure by demonstrat-
ing the "negative" consequences for the Vietnamese and for adjacent 
Southeast Asian peoples of the United States's withdrawal from Viet-
nam. Santoli's book attributes this withdrawal, of course, to a neurotic 
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protest movement that did not allow the American military to win the 
war. With this symbolic denouement, the "wound" suffered by "Amer-
ica" has been utterly, i f not explicitly, healed. To invoke an analogous 
metaphor, the ghost that has haunted the collective American psyche is 
exorcised. The internal divisions within the American body politic have 
not only been reconciled; the reconciliation has rendered the res publica 
stronger and more dedicated to the principles of American democracy 
in its struggle against radicals and communist imperialism. But what, 
in the context of the emergence of the end-of-the-Cold War discourse, 
needs to be thematized is that the metaphor of trauma has undergone 
a telling metamorphosis: the metaphor of the wound, which implies 
healing, that is, ideological reconciliation, has become — or is at the 
threshold of being represented as — a collective psychological illness, a 
national "syndrome," which implies the imperative to blame a negative 
ideological cause. 
The fourth and "final" phase of the American culture industry's re-
narrativization of the Vietnam War was inaugurated on the concurrent 
occasion of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the United States's sur-
gically executed "victory" against Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. 
What is especially telling about the official representation of this his-
torical conjuncture, especially by the television networks, is that, from 
beginning to end, it was this contrasting negative measure of Vietnam 
that utterly determined its narrative shape: the linear/circular structure 
of decisive victory. From the inaugural debates about the question of 
the legitimacy of America's intervention in the face of Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait through the brief period of the war itself to its immediate af-
termath, it was the specter of the Vietnam War — the "divisive" and 
"self-defeating" national anxiety precipitated by its radical indetermi-
 that the narrative structure of closure, enabled by a "victory" by 
the United States in the Cold War, was intended to decisively efface. This 
transformation of a national anxiety into a productive negative image 
was symptomatically reflected by President Bush's virtually unchallenged 
guarantee to the American public on the eve of the war that it would not 
be "another  and, more strategically, by the exclusive media-
tion of the events of the Gulf War by the American military information 
agencies in a way that the events of the Vietnam War had made un-
thinkable. And it was the long process of cultural forgetting, which had 
ostensibly (re)constituted the actual defeat of the United States into a 
drastically mistaken withdrawal from Vietnam, that had prepared the 
ground for this cultural transformation. In short, the representational 
forgetting of the actualities of the war systematically undertaken by the 
ideological state apparatuses had gradually arrived at a form of remem-
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bering it that attributed the defeat of America to the infectious impact of 
the multisituated protest movement in the United States on the American 
public and its intellectual deputies. 
In this "final" phase, that is, the earlier public need to "heal the 
wound" — a recuperative and conciliatory gesture of forgetting — be-
came, in the words of President George Bush and official Washington, a 
matter of "kicking the Vietnam  Aided and abetted by the 
culture industry, this early gesture of forgetting metamorphosed at the 
time of the Gulf "crisis" into a virulently assured assumption that the 
resistance to America's intervention and conduct of the war in Vietnam 
in the 1960s was a symptom of a national neurosis. (This interpretation 
of the active resistance to the Vietnam War was not a sudden reactionary 
political initiative enabled by the circumstances of the Gulf War. Its 
origins can be traced back to the period of the Vietnam War itself, to the 
reaction against the protest movement by such influential conservative 
and liberal humanist intellectuals as George Kennan, Walter Jackson Bate, 
and Allan Bloom, among many others. The disruptions of the traditional 
white Anglo-American and male-dominated cultural value system in 
American colleges and   whether in the form of the common 
body of shared knowledge informing the general education program [the 
 humaniores] or the canon of great books — were undertaken in 
the name of relevance. In the name of high seriousness, these anxious 
traditionalists reduced this emancipatory initiative to an unhealthy or 
neurotic obsession with novelty and/or vulgarity and represented   as 
Arnold had represented the rise of working-class consciousness in late 
Victorian   as a symptom not simply of a "centrifugal" process 
precipitating a dangerous cultural "heterogeneity," but as a collective 
"death wish" [Bate] on the part of the American academy.)** Whatever 
its limitations, the protest movement in the Vietnam decade was, in fact, 
a symptomatic manifestation of a long-overdue and promising national 
self-doubt about the alleged legitimacy of America's representation of its 
internal constituencies (blacks, women, gays, ethnic minorities, the poor, 
the young, and so on) and about the alleged benignity of its historically 
ordained exceptionalist mission to transform the world (the barbarous 
Others) in its own image. In this last phase of the amnesiac process, this 
healthy and potentially productive self-examination of the American cul-
tural identity came to be represented as a collective psychological sickness 
that, in its disintegrative momentum, threatened to undermine "Amer-
ica's" promised end.*' By this I mean the end providentially promised to 
the original Puritans and later, after the secularization of the body politic, 
by History: the building of "the city on the h i l l " in the "New World ," 
which is to say, the advent of the New World Order and the end of history. 
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In the wake of the Cold War, and especially the defeat of Saddam 
Hussein's army — and the consequent representation of the shattered 
American consensus occasioned by the Vietnam War as a recovery of 
a collective mental illness — there came in rapid and virtually un-
challenged succession a floodtide of "reforms," reactionary in essence, 
intended to annul the multiply situated progressive legacy of the protest 
movement(s) of the Vietnam decade by overt abrogation or accom-
modation. Undertaken in the name of the "promise" of "America," 
these reforms were intended to reestablish the ontological, cultural, and 
political authority of the enlightened, American "vital center" and its 
circumference and thus to recontain the dark force of the insurgent dif-
ferential constituencies that had emerged at the margins in the wake of 
the disclosures of the Vietnam War. At the domestic site, these included 
the coalescence of capital (the Republican Party) and the religious and 
political Right into a powerful dominant neoconservative culture (a new 
"Holy Alliance," as it were) committed to an indissolubly linked 
itantly racist, antifeminist, antigay, and anti-working-class agenda; the 
dominant liberal humanist culture's massive indictment of deconstruc-
tive and destructive theory as complicitous with fascist totalitarianism; 
the nationwide legislative assault on the  public univer-
sity by way of programs of economic retrenchment affiliated with 
the representation of its multicultural initiative as a political correct-
ness of the  the increasing subsumption of the various agencies 
of cultural production and dissemination (most significantly, the elec-
tronic information highways) under fewer and fewer parent, mostly 
American, corporations; the dismantling of the welfare program; and, 
symptomatically, the rehabilitation of the criminal president, Richard 
Nixon . At the international site, this "reformist" initiative has mani-
fested itself as the rehabilitation of the American errand in the world, 
a rehabilitation exemplified by the United States's virtually uncontested 
moral/military interventions in Panama, Somalia, Hai t i , Bosnia, the 
Middle East, and Kosovo; its interference in the political processes of 
Russia by way of providing massive economic support for Boris Yeltsin's 
democratic/capitalist agenda against the communist opposition; its uni-
lateral assumption of the lead in demanding economic/political reforms 
in Southeast Asian countries following the collapse of their economies 
in 1998; its internationalization of the "free market"; and, not least, its 
globalization of the instrumentalist version of the English language. 
What needs to be foregrounded is that these global post-Cold War 
"reformist" initiatives are not discontinuous practices, a matter of his-
torical accident. Largely enabled by the "forgetting" of Vietnam — and 
of the repression or accommodation or self-immolation of the emer-
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gent decentered modes of thinking the Vietnam War   they 
are, rather, indissolubly, however unevenly, related. Indeed, they are 
the multisituated practical consequences of the planetary triumph (the 
"end") of the logical economy of the imperial ontological discourse that 
has its origins in the founding of the idea of the Occident and its fulfilled 
end in the banal instrumental/technological reasoning in the discourse 
of "America." In thus totally colonizing thinking, that is, this imperial 
"Americanism" has come to determine the comportment toward be-
ing of human beings, in all their individual and collective differences, 
at large — even of those postcolonials who would resist its imperial 
order. This state of thinking, which has come to be called the New 
World Order (though to render its rise to ascendancy visible requires 
reconstellating  Vietnam War into this history), subsumes the repre-
sentative, but by no means complete, list of post-Cold War practices to 
which I have referred above. And it is synecdochically represented by 
the massive mediatization of the amnesiac end-of-history discourse and 
the affiliated polyvalent rhetoric of the Fax Americana. 
Understood in terms of this massive effort to endow hegemonic status 
to the transformation of the metaphorics of the "wound" to (neu-
rotic) "syndrome," the forgotten of the systematic process of forgetting 
apparently accomplished by the renarrativization of history since the hu-
miliatingly visible fall of Saigon in 1975 takes on a spectral resonance 
of epochal and planetary significance. As such, it calls on the differential 
community of oppositional intellectuals to undertake a genealogy of this 
end-of-history discourse that would retrieve  as precisely 
as possible the essence of that which the United States's intervention in 
Vietnam and its conduct of the war disclosed, that which the American 
Cultural Memory, in the form of a "new Holy Alliance," has feverishly 
attempted to bury in oblivion by way of its multisituated and long-term 
labor to hegemonize a demonic representation of this (self-)disclosure. 
The Logical Economy of 
the American Intervention in Vietnam 
The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the 
brain of the living. 
— K A R L M A R X , The Eighteenth  of Louis Bonaparte 
In dread, as we say, "one feels something uncanny  What is 
this "something" and this "one"? We are unable to say what gives "one" 
that "uncanny feeling." "One" just feels i t generally. A l l things, and we 
wi th them, sink into a sort of indifference. But not in the sense that every-
thing simply disappears; rather, in the very act of drawing away from us 
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everything turns towards us. This withdrawal of  which 
then crowds round us in dread, this is what oppresses us. There is noth-
ing to hold on to. The only thing that remains and overwhelms us whilst 
what-is slips away, is this "nothing." 
Nothing begets dread. 
— M A R T I N H E I D E G G E R , "What Is Metaphysics?" 
Ghost or revenant, sensuous-non-sensuous, visible-invisible, the specter 
first of all sees us. From the other side of the eye, visor effect, it looks 
at us even before we see it or even before we see period. We feel ourselves 
observed, sometimes under surveillance by i t even before any apparition. 
Especially — and this is the event, for the specter is of the event — it sees 
us during a visit. I t (re)pays us a visit. Visit upon visit, since it returns 
to see us and since visitare, frequentive of visere (to see, examine, con-
template), translates well the recurrence of returning, the frequency of a 
visitation. —JACQUES D E R R I D A , Specters of Marx 
It is impossible in this limited space to undertake a  articulated 
genealogy of the end-of-history discourse that now, albeit in a more nu-
anced form, saturates American cultural production and sociopolitical 
practice. But the increasingly abyssal gap between the logical econ-
omy  the representation  the Vietnam  by the dominant culture 
 the recalcitrant differential actualities  the war's   what, 
adapting Derrida to my purposes, I having been calling its  — 
enables us at least to suggest a persuasive provisional outline of such 
a genealogical project. For this all-too-visible spectral gap foregrounds 
a virulent imperial wi l l to reduce an irreducible differential occasion to 
decidability. It reveals, as it were, that this w i l l is tantamount to tortur-
ing the Other into a confession of a preestablished "truth."** As such, 
it repeats at the level of cultural discourse precisely the undeviating es-
sentialist "logic" of the United States's conduct of the war against the 
Vietnamese Other: the "European" or "imperial" logic informing its ex-
pectation of the decisive battle that ended not in a conclusive victory, 
but in an inconclusive defeat. And it is precisely this spectral gap — or 
rather, this indissoluble relay of spectral gaps — that is at stake in the 
argument. 
The American intervention in Vietnam was not determined solely by 
the Cold War scenario as such. It was not undertaken simply in the name 
of the capitalist economic/political "base." I t was also, and indissolubly, 
undertaken in the name of the (superstructural) discourse of (Occi-
dental/American) "Truth," that is, the ontological principles informing 
liberal/capitalist democracy. I mean the Enlightenment's representation 
of being that conferred legitimacy to "freedom and equality": those val-
ues insistently invoked by the end-of-history discourse to characterize 
the universal essence of the economic/political system that, it  
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has emerged triumphantly from the dialectical process of Universal His-
tory.** It is a seriously disabling mistake, in thinking the epochal event 
we call Vietnam, to subordinate, as all-too-much oppositional criticism 
has done, the ontological site — consciousness or theory — to the site 
of economics and/or politics, as if the latter were a base to the former's 
superstructurality; as if, that is, the essential — and essentialist — princi-
ples of liberal democracy were simply a matter of false consciousness.** 
And it is a mistake, not incidentally, that derives in large part from 
the "Marxists' " sundering and hierarchizing of Marx's de-centering of 
the "Hegelian" "consciousness" and yoking it by this violence to the 
"real life-process" of men and women. "Consciousness," Marx writes, 
"can never be anything else than conscious  A l l too char-
acteristic of Marxist or Left critique of the United States's intervention 
in Vietnam, the restriction of interrogation to the economistic/political 
terms of the Cold War problematic (the privileging of the imperialist/ 
capitalist motive) renders the ontological representation of the United 
States's imperialist intervention in Vietnam epiphenomenal. Which is to 
say in effect, unthinkable. As such, this reduction of an indissoluble re-
lay of lived experience to single and determinative base has predisposed 
criticism to be blind to the most crucial disclosure — certainly for the 
post-Cold War moment — of the Vietnam War: the disclosure that the 
hegemonic discourse of forgetting has occulted. Assuming provisionally 
that this blindness is the case, we are compelled to put the ontologi-
cal principles informing the American intervention in Vietnam and its 
conduct of the war back into play, not as a base to economic, polit i-
cal, and military superstructures, but as a lateral site of representation 
indissolubly, i f unevenly, related to these. 
The "mission" of the American Mission in Saigon was from the be-
ginning of the United States's involvement in Vietnam exceptionalist. 
Its self-ordained responsibility was to "win the hearts and minds" of 
the postcolonial Vietnamese to the self-evident truth principles of "the 
(always new) free wor ld" in the face of their profound contempt for 
European — Old World — imperialism. This representation of the Amer-
ican Mission in terms of its original "errand in the wilderness," which 
set America off from the rapacious and decadent Old World, is clearly 
suggested by the pervasive New Frontier rhetoric that accompanied the 
inauguration of President Kennedy's administration — a rhetoric inte-
grally related to Kennedy's establishment of the Special Forces, better 
known as the Green Berets. This was the cultural as well as military 
arm that was given the motto De opresso liber (To free the oppressed) 
and deployed in an advisory capacity in Vietnam with the intention of 
recalling and exemplifying to the world at large — both to the Soviet 
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Union and to a Europe recovering from the self-inflicted catastrophe of 
World War   the perennial pioneer spirit of "America." The Amer-
ican Mission, that is, represented its illegal and aggressive intervention 
in the civil struggle following the decisive defeat of the French by the 
Viet M i n h at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 not simply by contrasting its 
benignly disinterested motive to bring the principles of "freedom" to 
the Vietnamese people wi th the totalitarianism of Soviet and Chinese 
communism. The New Adamic American Puritans justified their colo-
nization of the "New World" by contrasting their exceptionalist errand 
in the wilderness with the repressive and exploitative practices of a spir-
itually decadent Europe. Similarly, the American Mission in Vietnam 
attempted to legitimate its intervention by insistently differentiating its 
democratic ethos not only from communism but also from the deca-
dent racist colonialism of France, the European imperial power that had 
ruled and exploited the Vietnamese people for a century before World 
War I I and that, despite the war's activation of a global anticolonialism, 
would continue to do so after the war. 
This deeply backgrounded and resonant cultural opposition was 
fundamental to the official and mediatic representation of the United 
States's involvement in Vietnam from the beginning of this involvement 
in the aftermath of the Geneva Convention. The testimony of the foreign 
policy of the Eisenhower administration and, not least, of such nation-
ally popular Cold War and anti-Old World texts as Dr. Tom Dooley's 
memoirs Deliver Us from Evil (1956) and Eugene Burdick's and Will iam 
Lederer's The Ugly American (1958) bears witness to this, the former, 
in apotheosizing by enacting the noble American frontier spirit in Viet-
nam, and the latter, in castigating the America mission in Southeast 
Asia for having abandoning it . But it was the English novelist Graham 
Greene who disclosed the (neo)imperial significance of this exceptional-
ist ideology in The Quiet American (1955), a novel that, predictably, 
was condemned in the United States as a reactionary affirmation of 
the anachronous Old World ethos, more specifically, as " 'an exercise 
in national projection' by a member of the British Empire history had 
passed by."** Graham Greene's development of the exceptionalist cul-
tural motif is integrally related to his satiric critique of the murderously 
innocent intentions of   (Greene's fictionalized version of the 
legendary American counterinsurgency figure Colonel Edward Lansdale, 
whose task was to develop a native "Third Force" in Vietnam that was 
neither French colonialist nor communist). And it is epitomized by the 
following conversation between Greene's  Fowler, the cynical 
and not entirely reliable English reporter, who, though he condemns 
French colonialism, prefers it to the colonialism that is practiced dev-
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astatingly in the name of anticolonialism by the United States, and "the 
quiet American," Alden Pyle, the unquestioning ephebe of the influen-
tial American Asian expert (we would now, in the wake of Edward 
Said's great book, call him an "Orientalist") York Harding, whose "ob-
jective" analysis of America's mission in the world, Greene implies, is 
utterly determined by the Cold War scenario. They have been caught in 
a tower manned by two young and frightened French Vietnamese sol-
diers at nightfall on their return to Saigon from a Caodaist festival at 
which Fowler accidentally learns that Pyle is secretly contacting a certain 
General The, the leader of this "Third Force," in behalf of the American 
Mission: 
"You and your like are trying to make a war wi th the help of 
people who just aren't interested." 
"They don't want Communism." 
"They want enough rice," I said. "They don't want to be shot 
at. They want one day to be much the same as another. They don't 
want our white skins around telling them what they want." 
" I f   
" I know the record. Siam goes, Malaya goes. Indonesia goes. 
What does 'go' mean?. . ." 
"They'll be forced to believe what they are told, they won't be 
allowed to think for themselves." 
"Thought's a luxury. Do you think the peasant sits and thinks 
of God and Democracy when he gets inside his mud hut at night?" 
"You talk as if the whole country were peasant. What about the 
educated? Are they going to be happy?" 
"Oh no," I said, "we've brought them up in our ideas. We've 
taught them dangerous games, and that's why we are sitting here, 
hoping we don't get our throats cut. We deserve to have them cut. 
I wish your friend York was here too. I wonder how he'd relish i t . " 
"York Harding's a very courageous man. Why, in  
"He wasn't an enlisted man, was he? He had a return ticket 
These poor devils can't catch a plane home. H i , " I called to them, 
"what are your names?" . . . They didn't answer "They think we 
are French," I said. 
"That's just i t , " Pyle said. "You shouldn't be against York, you 
should be against the French. Their  
If the ameliorative benignity of America's exceptionalist errand that 
differentiated it from the imperial rapacity of the Old World was self-
evident to the American Mission, it was not to an Oriental people 
deeply rooted in another, radically different, culture. This indifference 
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and/or resistance to the American Mission's effort to win the hearts 
and minds of the Vietnamese precipitated an American reaction that 
has been well documented, but the crucial significance of which has 
not adequately been understood and thematized by the historians of 
the Vietnam War. The refusal of their assent to these "self-evident" 
New World truths instigated an American practice that, however re-
luctantly, was characterized by the increasing visibility of the w i l l to 
power informing the benign truth discourse of liberal democracy. To 
adapt Jacques Derrida's rhetoric to my purposes, it compelled the "cen-
ter elsewhere" of the American Mission's freedom discourse, which is 
normally "beyond the reach of free play," down into the visible arena of 
the free play of criticism.** The "first" symptom of this "contradiction" 
was, of course, the American Mission's violent remapping of  — 
its representation of this single ancient culture as two distinct coun-
tries — and then the imposition, or, rather, the recurrent imposition, 
of a "legitimate" government in South Vietnam (the "Third Force," 
in the language of the Cold War scenario) that was represented as be-
ing "committed" to the "disinterested" discourse and practice of liberal 
democracy. 
Indeed, it might be said that the successful military strategy of the 
National Liberation Front (NLF, misleadingly represented by the Amer-
ican Mission as the "Vietcong") and, later, the North Vietnamese Army 
(NVA)  their practice of the "nomadic" hit-and-run tactics of guerrilla 
warfare — against an infinitely more formidable army was in some fun-
damental way based on their awareness of this resonant contradiction 
in the logical economy of the discourse of Occidental liberal democ-
racy. It is as if, having deciphered the imperial imperatives informing 
the ontological structure of the collective Occidental self during the long 
and painfully oppressive period of French colonial   the European 
perception of being in terms of the binary opposition between center 
and periphery and the linear/circular (decidable) narrative this binary 
enables — the Vietnamese Other discovered the Achilles' heel of Amer-
ica's (anthropo)logic and mounted their military resistance precisely in 
order to exploit this vulnerability. As Herman Rapaport observes in a 
brilliant Deleuzian reading of the "anticlimactic" art of war practiced 
by the NLF and the NVA: 
Truong Son of the N.L.F. reports that the North Vietnamese took 
very much into account the American expectation that one ought 
to win "decisive battles" in Vietnam. "Though somewhat dis-
heartened, the Americans, obdurate by nature and possessed of 
substantial forces, still clung to the hope for a military  
Spanos: Vietnam and the Pax Americana:
A Genealogy of the “New World Order”
25
150 Vietnam and the Pax Americana 
for decisive victories on the battlefield." Truong Son's comments 
are based on the perception that an American view of an all-or-
nothing victory can easily be converted to a tactic by which the 
"superior forces," anxious for quick victory, are by way of a cer-
tain fracturing, reduced to something less than victory. That is, 
the North Vietnamese immediately realized that a moleculariza-
tion of its forces among those of the Southern resisters would 
force the United States to spread its resources thin. Son's assess-
ment of this American strategy is that " i t did not specifically center 
on anything" and that "the Americans and their puppets had no 
definite way of utilizing their mobile and occupation forces " 
For this reason, even when conflict was "head on," that conflict 
would be articulated in terms of a certain passivity, since ac-
tion did not necessarily lead to anything more than action itself. 
Moreover, the communists saw to it that the "corps" would be 
disarticulated along various mobile "fronts" all at the same time. 
In doing so they insured that "action" would be reduced to ran-
dom or marginalized events which even if successfully won by the 
Americans would not mean victory.** 
Put negatively, the Vietnamese Other refused to resist the American 
military machine in the binary narrative terms prescribed by the logo-
centric discourse of the Occident. Rather, this Eastern Other countered 
the Occidental discourse and practice of structuration by de-structuring 
its (anthropo)logic: by a devious practice that drew the wi l l to power 
informing its "disinterestedness" out as a futile, however destructive, 
contradiction glaringly visible to the world. Specifically, the NLF and 
NVA chose a strategy of absence (of invisibility, of silence) in the face of 
a massive and formidable military force that, whatever its exceptional-
ist claims, was utterly and pervasively inscribed by a European cultural 
narrative of presence. I mean the "Roman" narrative of decidability, the 
(meta-physical) logical economy of which articulates, at the site of mil i -
tary practice, a distanced and totalized field of directional references and 
coordinates that facilitates an end (or objective) understood as the deci-
sive battle. The strategy of the Vietnamese Other, on the other hand, was 
analogous to that of the Eastern martial arts (most notably those deriv-
ing from the Tao), which, grounded on a comportment toward being 
that acknowledges the harmonious belongingness of being and noth-
ing, privilege a "passivity" that allows the aggressor to defeat himself.*' 
Based on the predictability of the American reaction, this "feminine" 
Vietnamese strategy of resistance fragmented and disarticulated a to-
talized military structure inscribed by a logocentric ontology and its 
Journal of Transnational American Studies, 6(1) (2015)
26
  
;h the 
  cer-
 is, 
 
r center 
 no 
 
: conflict 
 ac-
itself. 
 be 
;  
ran-
|by the 
nerican 
 
|ountered 
 
to power 
 
 and 
 face of 
:eptional-
1 cultural 
 the 
 of 
nces and 
 deci-
 was 
le deriv-
being 
noth-
 
 
a to-
' and its 
Vietnam and the Pax Americana 151 
privileged panoptic vision and oriented futurally toward a preconceived 
and decisive end:  
This ironic exploitation of the Occidental dread of Nothing and its 
imperially logocentric imperative to reify or spatialize (make visible and 
graspable) its temporal differentiations'** is borne witness to by virtu-
ally all the American soldiers who fought in Vietnam, as the insistently 
visible negatives in their symptomatically anguished reminiscences over-
whelmingly testify. I t is, for example, the reiterated witness of Philip 
Caputo in his autobiographical confession, A Rumor of War: 
Forming a column, my platoon started toward its  objective, a 
knoll on the far side of the milky-brown stream. It was an objec-
tive only in the geographical sense of the word; it had no military 
significance. In the vacuum of that jungle, we could have gone in 
as many directions as there are points on a compass, and any di-
rection was as likely to lead us to the VC, or away from them, as 
any other. The guerrillas were everywhere, which is another way 
of saying nowhere. The knoll merely gave us a point of reference. 
It was a place to go, and getting there provided us with the illusion 
we were accomplishing something.'** 
It is also the testimony of Tim O'Brien in his novel Going after Cacciato: 
They [the American soldiers] did not know even the simple things: 
a sense of victory, or satisfaction, or necessary  They did 
not know the feeling of taking a place and keeping it, securing a 
village and then raising the flag and calling it victory. No sense 
of order or momentum. No front, no rear, no trenches laid out 
in neat parallels. No  rushing from the Rhine, no beach-
heads to storm and win and hold for the duration. They did not 
have targets. They did not have a cause. They did not know if it 
was a war of ideology or economics or hegemony or spite. On a 
given day, they did not know where they were in Quang Ngai, 
or how being there might influence larger outcomes. They did not 
know the names of most villages. They did not know which v i l -
lages were critical. They did not know strategies. They did not 
know the terms of the war, its architecture, the rules of fair play. 
When they took prisoners, which was rare, they did not know the 
questions to ask, whether to release a suspect or beat on him. They 
did not know how to feel.'** 
The American Mission systematically divided the ineffable and vola-
tile Vietnamese land into four clearly defined and manageable units — 
I Corps, I I Corps, I I I Corps, IV Corps — and within these large units 
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imposed and reimposed smaller tables providing reference  to fa-
cilitate communication  directionality to the war effort.  this 
panoptic cartographic and classificatory strategy, which, as I suggested 
earlier in this book, constitutes the essential technology  the 
oped (post-Enlightenment) imperial project, Vietnam, like  other land 
mass  which the United States army has fought in modern times, 
refused to be reduced to this spatialized, classificatory, manageable — 
and banalized — abstraction. As virtually everyone who was " in coun-
try" bears witness, it remained for such technologically inscribed eyes a 
dread-provoking and malevolent labyrinth with no exit.'*'* 
Indeed, the related invisibility  the insurgents  the dislo-
cating Vietnamese landscape was so baffling to the American soldier 
that i t precipitated a common and — given their deeply inscribed pos-
itivistic ("American") frame of reference — an ontologically resonant 
rhetoric  spectrality.  wi th the rhetoric  invisibility 
that determines the meaning of Caputo's and O'Brien's representa-
tive testimony about the Vietnamese "enemy," the autobiographical 
literature  the Vietnam  is saturated wi th a culturally induced 
language that can do nothing other than identify the invisible Viet-
namese insurgents with a dread-provoking substantial insubstantiality, 
wi th "spirits," "phantoms," "wraiths," or "spooks" that "haunt" the 
American hunter: 
We called the enemy ghosts. "Bad night," we'd say, "the ghosts 
are out." To get spooked, in the lingo, meant not only to get 
scared but to get killed. "Don't get spooked," we'd say. "Stay cool, 
stay alive." Or we'd say: "Careful, man, don't give up the ghost." 
The countryside itself seemed   shadows and tunnels and 
incense burning in the dark. The land was haunted. We were fight-
ing forces that did not obey the laws of twentieth-century science. 
Late at night, on guard, it seemed that all of Vietnam was alive 
and   odd shapes swaying in the paddies, boogie-men 
in sandals, spirits dancing in old pagodas. I t was ghost country, 
and Charlie Cong was the main ghost. The way he came out at 
night. How you never really saw him, just thought you did. A l -
most magical — appearing, disappearing. He could blend with the 
land, changing form, becoming trees and grass. He could levitate. 
He could fly. He could pass through barbed wire and melt away 
like ice and creep up on you without sound or footsteps. He was 
scary. In the daylight, maybe, you didn't believe in that stuff. You 
laughed it off. You made jokes. But at night you turned into a 
believer: no skeptics in foxholes.'** 
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The patrol that morning had the nightmare quality which charac-
terized most small-unit operations in the war. The trail looped and 
twisted and led nowhere. The company seemed to be marching 
into a vacuum, haunted by a presence intangible yet real, a sense 
of being surrounded by something we could not see. It was the in-
ability to see that vexed us most. In that lies the jungle's  
to cause fear: it blinds. I t arouses the same instinct that makes us 
apprehensive of places like attics and dark alleys.  80)'"' 
Oh, that terrain! The bloody, maddening uncanniness of it! When 
the hideous Battle of Dak To ended at the top of H i l l 875, we 
announced that 4,000 of them were killed; it had been the purest 
slaughter, our losses were bad, but clearly it was another Ameri-
can victory. But when the top of the hill was reached, the number 
of NVA found was four.  Spooky. Everything up there was 
spooky, and it would have been that way even if there had been 
no war. You were there in a place where you didn't belong, where 
things were glimpsed for which you would have to pay and where 
things went unglimpsed for which you would have to pay, a place 
where they didn't play the mystery but killed you straight off for 
trespassing. The towns had names that laid a quick, chilly touch 
on your bones.'** 
The valley floor was even more eerie than the mounds. The rain 
continued. It was nearly impossible for Alpha to establish their 
precise position. Surrounded by fog and high grass they could not 
sight landmarks. The flat valley revealed no  
Cherry sat where he had been  For extended hours 
they all humped without speaking. For hours he marched seeing 
only the one man before him and at times not even seeing him. 
Cherry longed for a CP meeting. He looked to his  An 
uneasy feeling came upon Cherry. He looked left then right. 
Somebody was watching. He looked over his shoulder again at 
McCarthy. The mist was so thick it blurred his image. Cherry 
could feel eyes on the back of his neck. He glanced around anx-
iously. He could see nothing but dense walls of elephant grass. 
Maybe it's better not to look, he thought. He tried to ignore it . 
His stomach tightened. He felt as if something was about to reach 
out and grab him.'** 
Crazy Earl holds his bottle by the neck and smashes it across a 
fallen statue of a fat, smiling, bald-headed gook [a Buddha]. "This 
ain't a war, it's a series of overlapping riots. We blow them away. 
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They come up behind us before we're out of sight and shoot us 
in the ass. I know a guy in One-One that shot a gook and then 
tied a block of C-4 to him and blew him into little invisible pieces 
because shooting gooks is a waste of time — they come back to 
life. But these gooks piss you off so bad that you got to shoot some 
thing, any thing. Man , half the confirmed kills I got are civilians 
and the other half is water  
The last of these representative passages bearing witness to the baf-
flement of the American soldier in the face of the invisible enemy 
is perhaps the most telling. This is not only because the bafflement 
precipitated by the Other's invisibility most starkly discloses the utter 
inefficiency and wastefulness of the rigorous and efficient logic of de-
cidability to which it is necessarily (culturally) restricted: its inability to 
name and contain the mysterious Other. It is also because, in its deploy-
ment of this restricted narrative logic, it self-destructs. To anticipate, i t 
makes explicit the symbiotic relationship between the discursive prac-
tices of instrumental reason and spectrality: the seer/hunter becomes the 
seen/hunted. 
In thus overdetermining the spectrality of the invisible "enemy," this 
baffled writing, which would come to terms with the event of Vietnam, 
betrays what a purely political or economic analysis of this war, in its re-
liance on the disciplinary imperatives of positive "science," is precluded 
from attending to. I t does not simply disclose the blindness to  — 
to the Other, the lack, the difference, the trace, that is, the   of 
the imperial " t ruth" discourse informing this writing. As the grotesquely 
rigorous reasoning of the last passage makes chillingly clear, i t also dis-
closes the unthought violence that informs the logical economy of its 
 
The response of the American Mission to the "de-structive" strategy 
of the elusive Vietnamese Other was not to readjust its "European" mil-
itary tactics of decidability to a kind of warfare in which the spectral 
enemy was always hauntingly invisible and unknowable, in which, in 
other words, the differential Other refused to obey the Western rules of 
warfare. The American Mission, that is to say — and it is important to 
emphasize this — did not reorient its Western logocentric concept of war 
in the face of an enemy that refused to answer to the fundamental epis-
temic imperatives of the European Enlightenment: those emanating from 
the grounding principle of differentiation (within a larger identical struc-
ture). I mean by this last, the knowledge-producing disciplinary table 
(uniforms, insignia, rank, and so on) that would distinguish soldiers 
from civilians (and women and children) and its linear/circular impe-
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rial tactical geometries that would render the enemy's moves locatable, 
predictable, and masterable. On the contrary, the American response to 
these unexpected and psychologically and practically baffling conditions 
precipitated by the enemy's refusal to adhere to the structural imper-
atives of the hitherto self-evident liberal democratic narrative was — 
predictably — reactive. As is well known (despite the official effort to 
repress this knowledge), the Pentagon managers and the American Mis-
sion in Saigon simply substituted one European form of warfare for 
another, the frontal assault that would end in the decisive battle for 
a war of attrition. The "body count," it was hoped, would eventually 
deplete the spectral numbers of the Vietnamese Other's army to — in 
a telling locution — the point of no return. True to this unrelenting 
American wi l l to convert the spectral to verifiable numbers (tabula-
tion), this technologization (and routinizing) of death — Caputo refers 
to his soul-destroying duties as "Regimental Casualty Reporting Offi-
cer" as keeping "Wheeler's [his commanding officer's] scoreboard"  
  the American Mission retaliated by unleashing a technological 
firepower against the recalcitrantly invisible and undifferentiated Other 
unprecedented in (nonatomic) military history: 
We took space back quickly, expensively, wi th total panic and close 
to maximum brutality. Our machine was devastating. And versa-
tile. It could do everything but stop. As one American major said, 
in a successful attempt at attaining history, "We had to destroy Ben 
Tre in order to save it ."** 
I t was, i f we recall the testimony of the Bertrand Russell International 
War Crimes Tribunal of 1968 in Stockholm, a firepower that, in the 
scope, violence, and, above all, the necessary indiscriminateness of its 
application, bordered on genocide.** 
When this indiscriminate violence against the Vietnamese people and 
their earth at large became inescapably visible to the American public, a 
  and still to be adequately   transformation of 
the representation of America's involvement in Vietnam began to mani-
fest itself in the hegemonic discourse of the culture industry and in that 
of many government officials and intellectuals who had hitherto sup-
ported or had acquiesced to i t , a transformation that eventually aligned 
itself wi th that of the prominent antiwar spokespersons. The brutal 
conduct of the war came increasingly to be represented as a political be-
trayal of the principles of liberal democracy. As I have been suggesting in 
demonstrating the impossibility of differentiating the ontological repre-
sentation and the military practice of America in Vietnam, it is of crucial 
importance to remark about this turn that the     as-
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 on the Vietnamese people was not simply a military violence aimed 
at achieving an economic/political objective. It was also and indissol-
ubly a violence at the sites of ontology and culture, not to say of race 
and gender. The ugly justification by General Mark Clark, one of the 
great American commanders of World War I I , for the obliterative B-52 
bombings of North Vietnam in  was no accident: " I don't think 
it's necessary to have an invasion of Nor th Vietnam. And it would be 
just exactly what the enemy wants. He'd like us to put down  
men in the field. He'd put down  They're will ing to lose half 
of theirs, and ours is a precious commodity. And I wouldn't trade one 
dead American for 50 dead Chinamen."*'' (It is beyond the scope of this 
chapter to apply Clark's racist logic to the demographics of death within 
the American military body. Given the obvious fact that proportionately 
far more blacks than whites were fighting "Chinamen" in Vietnam, one 
is compelled to ask whether the dominant culture that Clark represents 
believed that the black man was, in the general's typically "American" 
rhetoric, as precious a commodity as his white counterpart.) 
This indissoluble relay of quantified violence mounted by the United 
States against the spectral Other (the Mil i tary Mission called this indis-
criminate violently reductive process "pacification") is clearly suggested 
by Frances FitzCerald in Fire in the Lake  I t is a book that remains 
one of the most profound meditations on the Vietnam War and one that, 
despite its predating of the posthumanist occasion, deserves to be carefully 
considered in any rethinking of the Vietnam decade in the post-Cold War 
period, especially that aspect of the war pertaining to the question of the 
relationship between cultural representation (narrative) and practice: 
At the Guam conference [April  President Johnson took 
the long-awaited step of putting all civilian operations under 
the command of General Westmoreland. His move signified that 
Washington no longer gave even symbolic importance to the no-
tion of a "political" war waged by the Vietnamese government. 
The reign of the U.S. military had begun, and with it the strategy 
of quantity in civilian as well as military affairs. 
As an assistant to Westmoreland, Robert Komer had something 
of the general's notion of scale. After all the history of failed aid 
programs, he believed that the only hope for success lay in sat-
 The U.S. government had no choice but to force its 
supplies upon the Vietnamese people: thousands of tons of bulgar 
wheat, thousands of gallons of cooking oil , tons of pharmaceuti-
cals, enough seed to plant New Jersey with miracle rice, enough 
fertilizer for the same, light bulbs, garbage trucks, an atomic re-
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actor, enough concrete to pave a province, enough corrugated tin 
to roof it , enough barbed wire to circle it seventeen times, den-
tists' drills, soybean seedlings, sewing kits, mortars, machine tools, 
toothbrushes, plumbing, and land mines. 
In part, of course, this aid was absolutely necessary, for the U.S. 
military was at the same time bombing, defoliating, and moving 
villages at such a rate that all the aid the United States could ship 
would not have been excessive as refugee relief.** 
In other words, this Logos-enabled totalizing and reifying wi l l to 
narrative decidability manifests itself at this juncture of America's in-
volvement in Vietnam in a promissory instrumental logical economy 
gone   a mono-mania, as it were. Like Wallace Stevens's jar in Ten-
nessee, as Michael Herr puts the synecdochic instance of the "Battle" of 
Khe Sanh, it "took dominion everywhere": 
A l l that was certain was that Khe Sanh had become a passion, the 
false love object in the heart of the Command In its outlines, 
the promise was delicious: Victory! A vision of as many as 40,000 
of them out there in the open, fighting it out on our terms, fighting 
for once like men, fighting to no avail. There would be a battle, 
a set-piece battle where he could be killed by the numbers, killed 
wholesale, and if we killed enough of him, maybe he would go 
away. In the face of such a promise, the question of defeat could not 
even be considered, no more than the question of whether, after Tet, 
Khe Sanh might have become militarily unwise and even absurd. 
Once it was all locked in place, Khe Sanh became like the planted 
jar in Wallace Stevens' poem. I t took dominion everywhere.*'' 
In Ariel and the Police, Frank Lentricchia brilliantly appropriates 
Herr's historically resonant insight into the affiliation between planting 
a promissory discourse and its taking dominion everywhere (the affili-
ated imperial metaphorics of the center and the periphery should not be 
overlooked) for his "New Americanist" project. In the process, he sug-
gests how deeply backgrounded in the American national self this nexus 
between knowledge production (the quantification/technologization of 
the spectral nothing) and imperial power is. He invokes the critiques of 
its imperial operations by such otherwise unlikely representative figures 
from quite various sites of American cultural production and times of 
American history as Stevens, William James, and Herr: 
Had Wallace Stevens lived through our Vietnam period he might 
have had the right answer to the question posed by Norman 
Mailer in 1967: Why Are We in Vietnam? Had he forgotten 
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what he knew, long before our military intervention in South-
east Asia, he would have been (had he lived so long) reminded 
by Michael Herr who at the end of his book Dispatches (1970) 
wrote: "Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam, we've all been there." Herr 
maybe in part knew what he knew because he had read Stevens, 
who taught him about where we've all been, all along: "Once it 
was all locked in place, Khe Sanh became like the planted jar in 
Wallace Stevens' poem. I t took dominion everywhere." Herr's per-
versely perfect mixed metaphor of the "planted jar," if it might 
have struck Stevens as an incisive reading of his poem, might also 
have awakened in him an obscure memory of one of the power-
ful philosophical presences of his Harvard days, Wil l iam James, 
writ ing out of the bitterness of his political awakening, writing 
on I March  in the Boston Evening Transcript against our 
 imperial incursion in the Orient: "We are destroying down 
to the root every germ of a healthy national life in these unfortu-
nate people We must sow our ideals, plant our order, impose 
our God." James might have ended his letter: "The Philippines the 
Philippines the Philippines, we've all been there."** 
But Herr's resonant genealogical insight should not be restricted to 
the site of (geo)politics alone, as Lentricchia tends to do. This providen-
tially justified promissory planting that took dominion everywhere was 
not — and has never been — confined simply to geopolitical space. It 
was, from the beginning (when the   the "saving remnant" or 
"seed-bearers" — planted the Massachusetts Bay Colony), carried out 
by America all along the indissoluble continuum of being, from the 
ontological (which is to say, the site of thinking as such) through the 
cultural, sexual, and racial to the sociopolitical sites. Indeed, as Herr's 
quite revealing focus on representation (the futural power of the promise 
informing the metaphorical planting) suggests, i t is even arguable that 
America overdetermined the central ontological site, rendered i t , that is, 
the basis of it polyvalent conduct of the Vietnam War. I t did not simply 
serve as the ultimate justification for, but also as the enabling principle 
of, the indiscriminate genocidal military practice of attrition. 
What I am suggesting in thus demonstrating the complicity between 
the principles informing the American project of "winning the hearts 
and minds" of the Vietnamese people and the genocidal devastation 
of Vietnam — indeed, the priority of these principles over the (super-
structural) latter — is that the savagely civilized execution of the war 
disclosed a terrible but essential contradiction in the discourse of "Amer-
ica." I t is a contradiction that, if i t did not decisively delegitimize its 
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claims to universal truth at that time, has haunted them ever since. The 
pursuit of the end of its instrumentalist logical economy by the United 
States — of its "objective," as the affiliated rhetoric of military tactics 
would put it — ended in the  of that logic. The "Amer-
ica" that intervened in Vietnam as early as the end of World War I I 
represented itself as that exceptionalist collective cultural identity that 
had its origins in the Puritans' New Adamic errand in the wilderness (a 
wilderness haunted by the native "salvages," who appeared to the Pu-
ritans as Satanic "spirits"). I t was thus an "America" that represented 
its intervention in Vietnam as a benign New World mission intended to 
plant the Word (the universal principle of freedom) that Europe, in the 
form of a decadent French colonialism, had forgotten in its selfish mate-
rialist pursuit of power. In the process of fulfilling what it represented 
as its historically ordained mission, "America" (like Aeneas vis-a-vis 
Turnus at the end of the Aeneid) showed itself to be informed by a mur-
derous (onto)logic, a logic of over-sight that, at a certain critical point in 
the encounter, justifies and compels the practical obliteration of any dif-
ferential and resistant force that would undermine its claim to universal 
truth and thus to its universal authority. 
Indeed, the self-destruction of America's cultural identity showed that 
this informing essentialist and imperial  rendered the process 
of obliteration productively possible by its reifying specular or panoptic 
imperatives. I mean the inherent power of this metaphysical logic to 
reduce difference  to identity from above  to name the 
nothing and the spectral differences it disseminates and thus to "com-
prehend" them: to make them totally graspable (com+prehendere), an 
" i t " that thus becomes "practically assailable," as it were. Thus, like 
Oedipus in Sophocles' de-struction of the emergent positivist discourse 
of seeing in classical Greece (or Darius in Herodotus's analogous rever-
sal of the hunter/hunted relationship in his paradigmatic account of the 
Scythians' defeat of the invading Persians) and the detective of the post-
modern anti-detective story,** the self-certain American detective in this 
antinarrative turns out to be the criminal; the judge turns out to be the 
judged; the man of reason turns out to be the madman. In short, to 
invoke the metaphorics that saturates the literature of witness emanat-
ing from the Vietnam War — and which I have said is intrinsic to the 
imperial   the see-er turns out to be the seen. 
"Search and destroy": this ubiquitous phrase in the discourse of the 
Vietnam War — by now reduced to a cliche emptied out of the hor-
rible content it acquired with the exposure of such atrocities as the 
M y Lai massacre — is, in fact, a codification of the indiscriminate v i -
olence mandated by the reactive military strategy developed by the 
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relay of commands constituting Mil i tary Assistance Command Vietnam 
 to defeat the uncannily invisible and elusive enemy in Vietnam. 
In thus putting ontological representation (and its origins in Roman im-
perialism) back into play in this genealogical retrieval of the event called 
"Vietnam" that would contribute to the writ ing of the history of the 
present global occasion, I want to suggest that this sedimented locution 
must be understood in more than simply military terms. It must also be 
read as the fulfillment in practice — as the material end — of the benign 
logical economy of the "disinterested" pursuit of truth. I t must, that 
is, be understood as the violent process of reification, inaugurated by 
imperialist Rome, privileged and developed by Enlightenment Europe, 
and appropriated by an "exceptionalist" America in modernity, that 
reduces the differential and elusive nothingness of   its "spectral-
i ty"  to an identical something in order to bring " i t " to light under the 
commanding and encompassing gaze of the concentering imperial eye. 
This delegitimizing contradiction in the logic of "America" — this 
complicity between the representation of being and power, seeing and 
domination, that is, searching out and destroying — manifested itself a 
quarter of a century ago in the epochal decade of the Vietnam War. 
But this chronology should not be allowed to justify the politically 
conservative interpretation of this disclosure that views it as an irrele-
vant aberration within American history (Francis Fukuyama and James 
Ceaser, for example). Nor should it be allowed to justify the polit i-
cally liberal interpretation, which views it as an "error of judgment" 
(Arthur Schlesinger, Robert McNamara, and Richard Rorty, for exam-
ple). I t should not, that is, occlude the perception of the indissoluble 
continuity between the America of the Vietnam War and the America of 
the historical "revolutionary" past and of the post-Cold War present. 
As the rhetoric I have underscored to foreground its essence suggests, 
this resonant contradiction in the discourse and practice of "Amer-
ica" was, for example, the proleptic testimony of Herman Melville, 
whose epochal witness, especially in Moby-Dick, has been consensu-
 obliterated by the custodians of the American Cultural Memory, 
not only by the enraged "Americanists" of his generation, but by the 
idolatrous founders of American literary studies — F. O. Matthiessen, 
Lionel Trilling, Richard Chase, R. W. B. Lewis, Quentin Anderson, and 
so on — at the outset of the Cold War.*' For in that anticanonical, in-
deed, subversive, novel, Melville recognized that Captain Ahab's deadly 
monomania was the fulfillment and end of the (onto)logic the "first" 
European settlers of America: the Puritans' New Adamic representa-
tion of being and its providentially ordained historical errand in the 
wilderness. He recognized, in other words, that Ahab's unrelenting and 
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unerring pursuit of the elusive white whale was precisely an American 
search and destroy mission against a spectral enemy that, like the Amer-
ican Mission's in Vietnam, was informed, legitimized, and enabled by 
the (American) Word. Reconstellating Melville's witness into the context 
of the Vietnam War, one can no longer read the following "canonical" 
passage from Moby-Dick without visualizing the systematic torching of 
Vietnamese villages, the defoliation of the Vietnamese landscape, the 
chemical poisoning of the rice paddies, the relentless B-52 bombings — 
all undertaken in the name of "saving Vietnam" for the free world: 
The White Whale swam before him as the monomaniac incarna-
tion of all those malicious agencies which some deep men feel 
eating in them, t i l l they are left living on wi th half a heart and 
half a lung. That intangible malignity which has been from the 
beginning; to whose dominion even the modern Christians ascribe 
one-half of the worlds; which the ancient Ophites of the east rever-
enced in their statue   Ahab did not fall down and worship 
it like them; but deliriously transferring its idea to the abhorred 
white whale, he pitted himself, all mutilated, against i t . A l l that 
most maddens and torments; all that stirs up the lees of things; 
all truth with malice in it ; all that cracks the sinews and cakes 
the brain; all the subtle demonisms of life and thought; all evil, to 
crazy Ahab, were visibly personified, and made practically assail-
able in Moby Dick. He piled upon the whale's white hump the sum 
of all the general rage and hate felt by his whole race from Adam 
down; and then, as if his chest had been a mortar, he burst his hot 
heart's shell upon  
This complicity between an ontology of presence and a concenter-
ing violence is also and fundamentally the symptomatic testimony of 
virtually all the American soldiers — not simply of Lieutenant William 
Galley's notoriously visible account of the M y Lai massacre — who 
have written about their "experiences" in Vietnam, even as they try 
desperately to transform the brutal tbisness — the historical specificity 
of America's brutal conduct — of the Vietnam War into war in gen-
eral. Philip Caputo's A Rumor of War, for example, is a retrospective 
meditation on the always and increasingly dislocating evanescence of 
the enemy — and the consequent "irresistible compulsion to do some-
thing." It culminates in a recollection of his fateful decision to order the 
cold-blooded execution of two young Vietnamese boys suspected of be-
ing Vietcong, who, along wi th the girl who was beaten in the process, 
turned out to be civilians. In his agonized effort to render his act of 
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murder intelligible, Caputo has recourse to a rhetoric that is remarkably 
similar to Melville's representation of Captain Ahab's state of mind: 
M y thoughts and feelings over the next few hours are irretrievably 
jumbled now, but at some point in the early evening, I was seized 
by an irresistible compulsion to do something. "Something's got 
to be done" was about the clearest thought that passed through 
my brain. I was fixated on the company's intolerable predicament. 
We could now muster only half of our original strength, and half 
of our effectives had been wounded at least once. I f we suffered 
as many casualties in the next month as we had in the past, we 
would be down to fifty or sixty men, little more than a reinforced 
platoon. I t was madness for us to go on walking down those trails 
and tripping booby traps without any chance to retaliate. Retali-
ate. The word rang in my head. I will retaliate. It was then that 
my chaotic thoughts began to focus on the two men whom Le 
Dung, Crowe's informant, had identified as Viet Cong. M y mind 
did more than focus on them; it fixed on them like a heat-seeking 
missile fixing on the tailpipe of a jet. They became an obsession. 
I would get them. I would get them before they got any more of 
us; before they got me. I 'm going to get those bastards, I said to 
myself, suddenly feeling giddy. (RW, 298-99)" 
Caputo symptomatically resists the reductive charge of murder lev-
eled by the Marine Command in its characteristically cynical effort to 
exonerate itself (and "America") of culpability. But like virtually all of 
the testimony of those "eye witnesses" who fought the war, he fails to 
conceptualize adequately the necessarily analogical relation between the 
logic informing his private act and that intrinsic to the United States's 
public practice. Instead, he attributes his temporary aberration to the de-
humanizing effects of "the war," whereas his text at large points to the 
absolute complicity between his American (anthropo)logic and the cul-
minating act of violence. In a way that Melville does not, Caputo fails 
to perceive or resists acknowledging that the logic that drove him to this 
act of murder is the logic of the culture he represents. He cannot see or 
resists admitting that this reifying logic is one that finally and inexorably 
manifests itself in an obsessed "focus" and "fixing," a "monomaniacal" 
reification, as it were, of the omnipresent uncanny force of the spectral 
Other intended, as Melville says of Ahab's objectification of the white 
whale into Moby Dick, to render " i t " "practically assailable," that, in 
other words, i t constitutes the necessary replication in miniature of the 
identifying logic of the collective totality of which he is an inscribed 
individual part. I do not simply mean the instrumental logic pursued 
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by the military court that is trying Caputo's "case," the logic of clo-
sure that obliterates the Vietnam War (including the political motives of 
the United States) in the blank — spectral — space of the trial's formal 
detective-story scenario. I also, and above all, mean the founding New 
Adamic/frontier logic and practice of "America" at large in Vietnam. 
This is what Caputo does not quite say in his agonized climactic effort 
against his inscribed grain to read the "conspicuously blank" square on 
the official form containing — and predisposing once and for all — the 
"truth" of the history of his "case": 
There was a lot of other stuff — statements by witnesses, inquiry 
reports, and so forth — but one square on form DD457 was con-
spicuously blank. It was the square labeled EXPLANATORY OR 
EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES ARE SUBMITTED HERE-
W I T H . Early in the investigation, I wondered why the investi-
gating officer had not submitted any explanatory or extenuating 
circumstances. Later, after I had time to think things over, I drew 
my own conclusion: the explanatory circumstance was the war. 
The killings had occurred in war. They had occurred, moreover, 
in a war whose sole aim was to ki l l Viet Cong, a war in which 
those ordered to do the killing often could not distinguish the 
Viet Cong from the civilians, a war in which civilians in  
zones" were killed every day by weapons far more horrible than 
pistols and shotguns. The deaths of Le Dung and Le Du could not 
be divorced from the nature and conduct of the war. They were 
an inevitable product of the war. As I had come to see i t , Amer-
ica could not intervene in a people's war without killing some of 
the people. But to raise those points in explanation or extenuation 
would be to raise a host of ambiguous moral questions. It could 
even raise the question of the morality of American intervention 
in Vietnam; or, as one officer told me, " I t would open up a real 
can of worms." Therefore, the five men in the patrol and I were 
to be tried as common criminals, much as i f we had murdered 
two people in the course of a bank robbery during peacetime. If 
we were found guilty, the Marine Corps' institutional conscience 
would be clear. Six criminals, who, of course, did not represent 
the majority of America's fine fighting sons, had been brought to 
justice. Case closed. I f we were found innocent, the Marine Corps 
could say, "Justice has taken its course, and in a court-martial con-
ducted according to the facts and the rules of evidence, no crime 
was found to have been committed." Case closed. Either way, the 
military institution won.   
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I f Caputo's witness against America is distorted by his vestigial 
inscription by "America," specifically by the postwar therapeutic dis-
course of universalism, Michael Herr's is not in the aftermath of the Tet 
Offensive in  The tragic horror in Melville's antebellum text be-
comes the ludic horror of carnival in Herr's own postmodern testimony, 
as the intonations recalling the Hollywood frontiersman voice of John 
Wayne in the last sentence of the inaugural passage of his great book 
suggest. But, like Caputo's symptomatic testimony, Herr's text bears wit-
ness not only to the specter that haunts both the American grunt and 
the collective totality of which he is a member, but also to the com-
plicity of their monomaniacal — indiscriminately violent — search and 
destroy logic: 
At the end of my first week in-country I met an information officer 
in the headquarters of the 25th Division at Cu Chi who showed 
me on his map and then from his chopper what they'd done to 
the Ho Bo Woods, the vanished Ho Bo Woods, taken off by giant 
Rome plows and chemicals and long, slow fire, wasting hundreds 
of acres of cultivated plantation and wild forest alike,  the 
enemy valuable resources and cover." 
It had been part of his job for nearly a year now to tell people 
about that operation; correspondents, touring congressmen, movie 
stars, corporation presidents, staff officers from half of the armies 
in the world, and he still couldn't get over it. It seemed to be keep-
ing him young, his enthusiasm made you feel that even the letters 
he wrote home to his wife were full of it, it really showed what you 
could do if you had the know-how and the hardware. And if in 
the months following that operation incidences of enemy activity 
in the large area of War Xone C had increased  and 
American losses had doubled and then doubled again, none of it 
was happening in any damn Ho Bo Wood, you'd better believe  
Thinking the Specter of Vietnam 
The Question of the nothing puts us, the questioners, in question. 
— M A R T I N HEIDEGGER, "What Is Metaphysics?" 
Pyle said, "It's awful." He looked at the wet on his shoes and said in a 
sick voice, "What's that?" 
"Blood," I said. "Haven't you ever seen it before?" 
He said, " I must get them cleaned before I see the Minister." 
— G R A H A M GREENE, The Quiet American 
We are now, after this lengthy detour, prepared to address the question 
posed earlier about the unabated persistence of the national obsession 
Journal of Transnational American Studies, 6(1) (2015)
40
his vestigia 
 dis-
 of the l e t 
Hum text be-
|ern testimony, 
 voice of John 
lis great book 
 bears wit-
Ian grunt and 
so to the com-
 and 
 officer 
 showed 
j'd done to 
 by giant 
 hundreds 
 the 
) tell people 
nen, movie 
 armies 
 to be keep-
Is the letters 
  you 
 And if in 
' activity 
 and 
 none of it 
  
 
 
 said in a 
 American 
 question 
 obsession 
Vietnam and the Pax Americana 165 
over Vietnam long after the end of the war, indeed, after the official 
announcement of the end of its end in the wake of the United States's 
victory over the Iraqi army in  mean the question about the unre-
lenting and unassuagable anxiety that continues to afflict the American 
national self: What, precisely, has the  American cultural 
agenda of forgetting been trying obsessively to forget? What, as it were, 
is the specter that has haunted "America" since its intervention a half-
century ago in a people's war in a Third World country in Southeast 
Asia? The foregoing retrieval of the historical specificity of the Vietnam 
War suggests that the answer to this question lies precisely in the Amer-
ican Cultural Memory's systematic (if not conspiratorial) occlusion of 
its historicity by metaphorizing the actual cultural and sociopolitical ef-
fects of the war, first in the therapeutic terms of "healing a wound" 
and later, in the context of the end of the Cold War, of "kicking" a na-
tional neurosis (the Vietnam syndrome). The retrieval of the thisness of 
the Vietnam War from its generalization, in other words, suggests that 
what is at stake in the obsessive national effort to allay this ghost is 
far more ideologically important than the belated rehabilitation of the 
American veteran. Indeed, the ideological stakes are far more important 
than the recuperation of the national (good)will (as it has been itera-
tively claimed by those consensus builders who are calculatively aware 
of this amnesiac process) or, for that matter, than America's loss of its 
first war (as it is claimed by those adversarial intellectuals who would 
resist this amnesiac process). The retrieved historical context suggests, 
rather, that this would-be forgotten is nothing less than the symptomatic 
recognition of the abyssal aporetic space opened up in the logic of lib-
eral democracy by the disclosure of the necessary complicity between the 
ontologically derived principles of American democracy not simply wi th 
imperialism, but also with the violent practice of genocidal power. It is a 
complicity that, in keeping with the Enlightenment's "repressive hypoth-
esis," had heretofore been occluded by the alleged incommensurability 
between the principles and the violence. The retrieval of the thisness of 
the Vietnam War suggests, in short, that this would-be   this 
spectral trace, as it were — is the dreadfully intolerable because cultur-
ally and politically disabling awareness of an epistemic break. I mean a 
break that has rendered the truth of the idea of "America" vulnerable 
to radical interrogation at a moment when it is loudly representing itself 
as the plenary "end"  noncontradictory   of History. 
By thus remembering the spectral reality that the American Cultural 
Memory would forget and "naming i t " an "epistemic break," I am 
not restricting my critique to a constituency of the dominant culture 
that would employ power overtly in the name of the  be-
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nign principle of "America." I am also, and above all, pointing to the 
delegitimation of an "alternative" — liberal/recuperative — but finally 
continuous critique that represents this resonantly spectral contradic-
tion as an accident of American history: as the consequent, that is, 
either of a "mistake" of individual and/or national judgment (Robert 
McNamara, for example) or of a political "betrayal" of the positive 
principles of liberal American democracy (Senator Will iam Fulbright, 
Arthur Schlesinger Jr., and Richard Rorty, for example). By "epistemic 
break" I mean, rather, like Foucault, the decisive and irreversible disin-
tegration and delegitimation of the indissoluble relay of representational 
  ontological, epistemological, cultural,   that 
collectively, however unevenly, constitute what a period at large assumes 
and represents to be the self-evident universal truth. I mean specifically 
the (self-)exposure of the latent obliterating violence against being — 
we are entitled now to call i t "the Ahabism" — informing the logical 
economy of the principles of freedom and equality professed by ex-
ceptionalist "America": "America," that is, understood in terms of the 
secularization of the Puritan errand in the wilderness in the period of the 
Enlightenment (the American Revolution and the making of the Ameri-
can Constitution) and its expansionist practice in the nineteenth century 
in the name of Manifest  To appropriate Antonio Gramsci's 
historically specific terms, I mean the self-de-struction of the hegemonic 
discourse of the American cultural identity and its radical and decisive 
delegitimation. Henceforth, "America" wi l l no longer be able to repress 
the Other or accommodate it within its imperial structure; the Other 
wi l l always already manifest itself as a specter that haunts the "truth" of 
"America." This decisive appearance of the spectral gaze is what I have 
taken and continue to take the "postmodern condition" to mean — if 
it is recognized that America's global mission is the consequence not of 
its self-professed exceptionalist status, but of its self-proclaimed assump-
tion of the burden of fulfilling the mission civilisatrice that Europe (the 
Old World) betrayed in its decadence. 
Let me recall at this critical conjuncture the post-Cold War Hegelian 
theorization of the dominant culture's general representation of the end 
of the Cold War as the planetary triumph of liberal capitalist democ-
racy and the end of history. Reconstellated into the historical context I 
have retrieved — the context that this  problematic would, 
because of its "historical superfluity," obliterate as a "distraction" from 
"the larger [completed] pattern" of   this post-Cold War rep-
resentation of contemporary history comes to seem remarkably hollow. 
I t takes on the lineaments of a kind of desperate rewriting — or "air-
brushing""" — of history that liberal democratic Cold Warriors always 
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and relentlessly accused communist Cold War historians of perpetrat-
ing. As its deletion of this epochally transformative hot moment of the 
Cold War suggests, in other words, this "objective" representation of 
the post-Cold War global scene becomes itself, like the monomaniacal 
logic that propels Captain Ahab's inexorable pursuit of the white whale, 
the self-confirming imperial end of the  and ruthlessly re-
pressive Cold War narrative inaugurated at the end of World War I I to 
contain any thought or   both within and beyond America's bor-
ders — resembling Marxist communism. Or, rather, this end-of-history 
discourse becomes the decisive resolution in theory of that recuperative 
phase of the relentlessly undemocratic democratic Cold War narrative 
undertaken to pacify the threat to the national consensus posed by the 
withdrawal of spontaneous consent to the " t ru th" of "America" by a 
large constituency of American society in response to the self-disclosure 
of the terrible contradictions — the genocidal violence — informing the 
benign logic of America's intervention in the Vietnam "wilderness" and 
its conduct of the war. That is to say, this end-of-history discourse can 
be seen as the fulfillment of the postwar cultural imperative "to heal the 
wound." 
But the implications of this retrieval of the terrible specificity of the 
Vietnam War are not limited to the exposure of the historical occlusions 
thematized by the amnesiac end-of-history discourse. In foregrounding 
the inordinately important role played by ontological representation in 
the renarrativization of the Cold War after the decisive self-destruction 
of the discourse of "America" during the decade of the Vietnam War, 
this retrieval also suggests why the presently privileged oppositional dis-
courses are inadequate to the task of resisting the dominant culture's 
representation of the global post-Cold War occasion as the end of his-
tory (the Pax Metaphysica) and the advent of the New World Order 
presided over by the United States: the Pax Americana. I am referring 
specifically to the neo-Marxist discourse deriving from Fredric Jameson's 
identification of postmodernism with the cultural logic of late capital-
ism, to the New Historicism, to the cultural and postcolonial criticisms 
that in large part derive from the former, and to that postnational dis-
course, exemplified by Bill Reading's, that, in attempting to overcome 
the ineffectuality of these, would assume a global perspective focused 
on transnational capital that represents "America" as obsolete. 
It w i l l be the purpose of the remaining chapters of this book to an-
alyze the inadequacies of these "postmodern" discourses to the task 
of resisting the discourse of the Pax Americana and to proffer 
gomemally an alternative on the basis of this critical analysis. Here, i t 
wi l l suffice to suggest that these oppositional discourses are, each in its 
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own particular way, blinded by their insights not only to precisely what, 
in the present historical conjuncture, is strongest in the discourse of the 
dominant liberal/capitalist culture of the post-Cold War period: its justi-
fication of global power on the basis of an ontological representation of 
temporal history (being) that ends in the triumph of the cultural, social, 
political, and especially economic formations that are constructed on its 
foundation. In failing to perceive what is strongest in the "triumphant" 
imperial discourse of liberal/capitalist democracy, each of these opposi-
tional discourses, in turn, is also blinded to what is weakest and most 
vulnerable in it. I mean, to repeat, the ontological   what 
I have been calling the specter — at the enabling center of its "be-
nign" global discourse: the violent genocidal w i l l to power that was the 
"end" of the (onto)logical economy that justified America's intervention 
in Vietnam and its indiscriminately murderous conduct of the war. 
Al l of which is to say, finally, that an adversarial discourse that would 
be adequate to the task of resisting the New World Order — that, in 
Noam Chomsky's aptly ironic phrase, would be capable of "deterring 
  would do well not simply to reconstellate and rethink 
"Vietnam" in the context of the annunciation of the end of history, 
but, in doing so, to take its directives precisely from the spectral con-
tradictions (the radical differences) precipitated by the "fulfillment" of 
the imperial logic of the American anthropologos in the Vietnam War. 
In other words, the retrieval of the repressed history of the Vietnam 
War points to an adversarial strategy that would refuse to engage its 
infinitely more formidable antagonist according to the terms prescribed 
by the latter's imperial problematic, would not, that is, be answerable 
to the " t ruth" of its visibly invisible metanarrative. I t calls for the 
adoption of a strategy that exploits its adversary's essential weakness: 
the powerful wi l l to closure that hides behind its tolerance of differ-
ence, its alleged pluralism. It calls, that is, for an adversarial strategy 
that, like the strategy of the Vietnamese Other in the face of the ut-
terly predictable narrativity of the American invaders' metaphysically 
structured discourse and practice, takes the form of an itinerant spec-
trality. I mean a nomadic phantasmagoric absence, a mobile nonpresent 
presence, a haunting invisibility, that reverses the panoptic gaze of the 
dominant culture in transforming itself as seen into absent see-er. In 
short, the retrieval of the repressed history of the Vietnam War calls for 
a de-structive strategy that, like the Vietnamese Other vis-a-vis "Amer-
ica," resists identification and thus frustrates the w i l l to closure of the 
triumphant culture and in so doing dis-integrates its discourse of decida-
bility and arrival, which is to say, disempowers and delegitimizes its 
imperial power and legitimacy. 
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Commenting on the representation of the Vietnam War by the Ameri-
can Mission and the legion of American correspondents based in Saigon 
who got their truths from it,  Herr writes decisively: 
[I]n back of every column of print you read about Vietnam there 
was a dripping, laughing death-face; it hid there in the newspapers 
and magazines and held to your television screen for hours after 
the set was turned off for the night, an after-image that simply 
wanted to tell you at last what somehow had not been told."* 
It is not simply the   the "secret   that had somehow 
not been told by the American media that now, in the post-Cold War 
occasion, calls for retrieval. What the collective wi l l to forget this story 
demands beyond that imperative is that we think the laughing death-
face — the polysemous specter of Vietnam — that remained to haunt our 
information-filled American living room long after we turned our tele-
vision set off. For in that haunting apparition there resides a "reality," 
a "saying," that, precisely because of its "unreality" and its unsayable-
ness, can have no proper place in the tables of the New World Order. 
To say that this "reality"  this "saying"  have no proper place 
in the tables of the New World Order is to say, of course, that " i t " con-
stitutes a mortal threat to the "triumphant" technological "age of the 
world picture." 
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of Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: 
Routledge, 1994), 64; hereafter cited in the text as 5M. 
92. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto (New York: 
International Publishers, 1948), 8. 
93. See Vasilis Lambropoulos, "Writing the Law," in Rise of  
215-31. 
94. Fredric Jameson, "Marx's Purloined Letter," New Left Review 209 (Jan-
uary/February 1995): 96. A cursory review of Eliot's editorial contributions to 
The Criterion will reveal the inordinate degree to which the Virgilian refer-
ence presides. See also Gereth Reeves, T.  Eliot: Virgilian Poet (New York: 
St. Martin's, 1989), esp. chapter 4, "Empire and the Agrarian Ideal," 96-116. 
95. Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in Illumina-
tions, trans. Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 
1969), 256. 
96. Constantine Cavafy, "Waiting for the Barbarians"; my translation. It is 
no accident that J. M . Coetzee invokes Cavafy's poem as the title of his great 
postcolonial novel Waiting for the Barbarians. 
3. Vietnam and the Pax Americana 
1. This initiative is evident in the work of such diverse late postmodern 
critics as Fredric Jameson, Michael Hardt, Paul Bove, Masao Miyoshi, Ronald 
Judy, and  Godzich. But it is most succinctly and provocatively exempli-
fied by Bill Readings in The University in Ruins (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1996). I am in full agreement with Reading's critique of the 
nationalist localism of North American critical thinking in the present histor-
ical conjuncture and with his general recommendation that American critical 
inquiry be reconstellated into the global scene. Indeed, I would go further to say 
that only acute and rigorous attention to the planetary contexr will enable the 
realization of the full extent and depth to which the university and its inherited 
critical paradigms have been rendered virtually useless by the new transnational 
"reality" that these global transformations have produced. I am referring, above 
all, to the planetary triumph of "technological" thinking, a thinking that, in 
bringing the third, anthropological phase of the ontotheological tradition to 
its end (fulfillment), has compelled the adversarial cultures to think their op-
position in terms of the logical economy of the triumphant imperial discourse. 
But there is, in Reading's recommendation for such a displacement, the implicit 
suggestion that new forms, languages, and forums abandon the "local" site of 
"America" in the process. This representation of the site of America as having 
been rendered obsolete by current historical events — the emergence of trans-
national capital as overdetermined site of inquiry — strikes me as an evasion, if 
this revisionary strategy does not involve the role "America," if not the United 
States of America, has played and continues to play in the post-Cold War period 
in shaping the global context Readings privileges. Reading's recommendation, I 
suggest, constitutes a circumvention of the historical specificity of the transfor-
mational history culminating in the overdetermination of the planetary scene. It 
thus inadvertently repeats the fateful forgetting of the question of being that has 
characterized the representation of history by the dominant, especially Ameri-
can, culture ever since the fall of Saigon in 1975. I mean, as I will show, the 
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systematic forgetting of the epochal disclosures vis-a-vis the American episteme 
precipitated by the Vietnam War. 
2. There are, on the other hand,   the optimistically "progressive" 
critics referred to   who interpret the professionalization of "theory" as 
evidence of the positive political impact that contemporary criticism has had 
not only in the academy but in the "world." See, for example, Bruce Rob-
bins, Secular Vocations: Intellectuals, Professionalism, Culture (London: Verso, 
1993). 
3. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" National Interest 16 (sum-
mer 1998): 3-18; and Fukuyama, End of History and the Last Man (New 
York: Free Press, 1993); hereafter cited in the text as EH. Basing his reading 
of Hegel on Alexander Kojeve's interpretation of the dialectical history of the 
Absolute Spirit, Fukuyama attempts to overcome the weaknesses of the deter-
ministic reading of Hegel (which he associates with a totalitarian — Hegelian 
Marxist — politics) by identifying it with "historicism" and "liberal democ-
racy": "While Hegel may not have been the  philosopher to write about 
history, he was the first historicist philosopher — that is, a philosopher who 
believed in the essential historical relativity of truth. Hegel maintained that all 
human consciousness was limited by the particular social and cultural condi-
tions of man's surrounding environment — or, as we say, by 'the times.' Past 
thought, whether of ordinary people or great philosophers and scientists, was 
not true absolutely or 'objectively,' but only relative to the historical or cultural 
horizon within which that person lived" (EH, 62). But Fukuyama insists on the 
"directionality" (EH, 55-70), the progress, of history toward an end understood 
as both termination and fulfillment (maturation) of an initial seminal potential, 
that, in other words, dialectically annuls its conflictual temporal character — 
negates its negativity. This qualification clearly betrays its reinscription in the 
Enlightenment (anthro-logical) version of metaphysics, an ontology of presence 
that informs the differential events of history, thus reducing them to a com-
plicated matter of "mere" appearance: "Where Hegel differed from Fontenelle 
and from more radical historicists who came after him was that he did not be-
lieve that historical process would continue indefinitely, but would come to an 
end with an achievement of free societies in the real world. There would, in 
other words, be an end of  (EH, 64). The complicity of this Hegelian 
dialectic with Eurocentrism and European imperialism is everywhere manifest 
in Hegel's Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover, 1956): 
"At this point we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it is no histori-
cal part of the world; it has no movement or development to exhibit.... What 
we properly understand by Africa, is the Unhistorical, Underdeveloped Spirit, 
still involved in the conditions of mere nature, and which had to be presented 
here only as on the threshold of the World's History" (99). "The History of 
the World travels from East to West, for Europe is absolutely the end of History, 
Asia the beginning"  It is the terrorism of this Hegelian dialectic, which re-
duces the being of peoples whose cultures it cannot accommodate to nonbeing, 
that haunts Fukuyama's thesis. For a powerful indictment of Hegel's dialectical 
philosophy of history as it pertains to the "immaturity" (Umreife) of the civiliza-
tions of pre-Columbian Latin America, see the chapter titled "Eurocentrism" in 
Enrique Dussel, The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of the "Other" and the 
Myth of Modernity (New York: Continuum, 1995), 19-26. 
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4. Richard Haass, The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States after the Cold 
War (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Foreign Affairs, 1997). The very title of 
Haass's book, which invokes a variant of the metaphorics of Manifest Des-
tiny that justified the United States's Westward expansionism in the nineteenth 
century, bears witness to the continuity of its ontologicaliy ordained imperial 
project. 
5. Michael Herr, Dispatches (New York: Vintage Books, 1991 [1977]), 71. 
6. Robert McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam 
(New York: Random House, 1995), xvi. 
7. On the twentieth anniversary of the fall of Saigon, CNN presented 
a two-hour reprise of the Vietnam War in which a number of "leading" 
participants, including the North Vietnamese commander Ceneral Ciap, were 
interviewed. The structural arrangement of this ritualized media event and the 
perspective of the questions it posed to the actors in its narrative were clearly 
oriented to distance the war. Like all the other periodically staged ritual remem-
brances of the war, they were designed to convey to the American public the 
sense that it was finally over and thus to exorcise its ghost. 
8. McNamara, In Retrospect, 203. After McNamara left the Johnson ad-
ministration in 1968, he became director of the World Bank, where, in the 
name of ameliorating the conditions of "undeveloped" Third World nations, he 
brought this same dehumanized problem-solving thinking to the reorganization 
of this powerful global capitalist institution. One of the legacies of his direc-
torship is the present economic, political, and ecological catastrophe that has 
overtaken many of the Third World countries of Southeast Asia. For a critical 
analysis of his directorship of the World Bank, see Susan George and Fabrizio 
Sabelli, Faith and Credit: The World Bank's Secular Empire (Boulder, Colo.: 
Westview Press, 1994), 37-57, 118ff. 
9. The latest of these is the CD-ROM The War in Vietnam: A Multime-
dia Chronicle, produced by CBS News and the  York Times (New York: 
Macmillan Digital U.S.A., 1996), and the American media's programming of 
documentaries, interviews, and symposia commemorating the watershed year 
of the Vietnam War, 1968. See, for example, the C-Span 1998 symposium 
on the twentieth anniversary of the Tet Offensive moderated by Marvin  
which included David Halberstam, Stanley Karnow, and Barry Zorthian, and 
the 1998 PBS documentary 1968: The Year That Shaped a Generation, written 
and directed by Steven Talbot. 
10. Sacvan Bercovitch, The American jeremiad (Madison: University of Wis-
consin Press, 1978): " I approach the myth [of 'America'] by way of the jeremiad, 
or political sermon, as the New England Puritans sometimes called this genre, 
meaning thereby to convey the dual nature of their calling, as practical and as 
spiritual guides, and to suggest that, in their church-state, theology was wedded 
to politics and politics to the progress of the kingdom of Cod. These sermons 
provide most of the evidence in my discussion of early New England. But I 
draw widely on other forms of the literature as well — doctrinal treatises, his-
tories, poems, biographies, personal   in order to place the jeremiad 
within the large context of Puritan rhetoric,  the much larger context of 
American rhetoric, ritual, and society through the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.... I argue  the Puritans' cries of declension and doom were part 
of a strategy designed to revitalize the errand ['in the wilderness']." Bercovitch 
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adds tellingly: "Even when they are most optimistic [however] the jeremiads 
express a profound disquiet. Not infrequently, their  betray an un-
derlying desperation — a refusal to confront the present, a fear of the future, 
an effort to translate 'America' into a vision that works in spirit because it can 
never be tested in fact" (xiv). The American jeremiad, in other words, is a cul-
tural mechanism designed to remember the American calling by forgetting its 
actuality, but what it represses in thus memorializing the calling always returns 
to haunt this memory. It is in this sense that Bercovitch's analysis of the Amer-
ican jeremiad can be applied to the amnesiac remembering of Vietnam in the 
 period. 
11. For exemplary instances of this now-pervasive equation, see Allan 
Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed 
Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students (New York: Si-
mon and Schuster, 1987); Roger Kimball, Tenured Radicals: How Politics Has 
Corrupted Our Higher Education (New York: Harper and Row, 1990). 
12. See, for example, Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, Heidegger and Modernity, 
trans. Franklin Philip (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Ferry and Re-
naut, French Philosophy of the Sixties: An Essay on Antihumanism, trans. Mary 
Schnackenburg Cattani (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1990); 
David Lehman, Signs of the Times:  and the Fall of De Man 
(New York: Poseidon Press, 1991); David H. Hirsch, The Deconstruction of 
Literature: Criticism after Auschwitz (Hanover, N . H.: Brown University Press, 
1991); Richard  The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin 
Heidegger (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Wolin,  The Hei-
degger Controversy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992) (the volume 
contested by Jacques Derrida for its inclusion of an unapproved translation of 
one of his pieces on Heidegger in a context patently intended to lend Derrida's 
authority to the sustained effort to delegitimize Heidegger's thought); Robert 
Holub, Crossing Borders: Reception Theory,   
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,  esp. the chapter titled "The Un-
comfortable Heritage," 148-201; Tom Rockmore, On Heidegger's Nazism and 
Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); and John D. Caputo, 
Demythologizing Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993). 
13. See Vietnam in America: Ten Years after the Fall of Saigon, a special 
issue of the New York Times Magazine, March 31, 1985. 
14. This project is in process, tentatively titled Representing Vietnam: The 
American Cultural Memory and the Forgetting of Vietnam. 
15. Virginia Carmichael, in Framing History: The Rosenberg Story and the 
Cold War (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), has shown how 
the American culture industry exploits (re)narrativization to bring "undecid-
 historical events — and the national anxiety they activate (the doubts 
about the legitimacy of power) — to closure. Her instance is the disturbing 
execution of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg as Soviet spies in 1953, which was 
motivated more by American Cold War ideology than by legal evidence. Under-
stood in terms of this renarrativizing project, the  War of 1991 was to 
the national trauma activated by the Vietnam War what the "tapes [allegedly 
acknowledging the Rosenbergs' contribution to the Soviet Union's production 
of its first atomic bomb] said to have been made by Khrushchev" was to the 
national trauma precipitated by the execution of the Rosenbergs. 
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16. As in The Green Berets, the enemy in virtually all the films, docu-
mentaries, and oral histories "remembering" the Vietnam War is invariably 
represented as a faceless   a "gook," "dink," "slope" (a metonymy 
that evokes the species "Oriental hordes"), or simply a "Charlie" (which sug-
gests the ventriloquized puppet). They are also represented as male, despite the 
obviously dislocating fact that women played a significant part in the struggle of 
the Vietnamese people against the United States army. A significant exception to 
this frame of representational reference is Stanley Kubrick's Full Metal Jacket, 
a film in which the brief end, which discloses the faceless murderous Vietcong 
sniper to be a young girl, deconstructs the perennial self-representation of the 
American soldier as benign deliverer (of women and children) to reveal him as a 
racist male phallus-killer. 
17. The  degree to which the representation of the "reality" of 
Vietnam in The Green Berets is determined by the (popular) American imagi-
nary is measured by its structural similarity with the Hollywood western epic 
The Alamo (1960), produced and directed by John Wayne. 
 Not accidentally, the American soldier invariably referred to the combat 
mission that took him out of a "base camp" into the Vietnamese "wilderness" as 
a foray into "Indian country": "It is midafternoon. The company is strung out 
along the trail on the north bank of the river. There is no front in this war, but 
we are aware that we have crossed an undefined line between the secure zone 
and what the troops call 'Indian country' " (Philip Caputo, A Rumor of War 
[New York: Ballantine Books, 1977], 102). The genealogy of this pervasive lo-
cution has its origins, of course, in the discourse of the American frontier, which 
represents the space beyond the white settlements as a dark wilderness inhab-
ited by savages. But it is also one that became common currency in the canonical 
racist/imperialist writing of nineteenth-century American historians of the period 
of the French and Indian Wars. See, for example, Francis Parkman, The Con-
spiracy  (New York: Library of America, 1984 [1851]). In tracing the 
origins of Pontiac's "conspiracy," Parkman, for example, writes: "[S]oon after, 
a report gained ground that every post throughout the Indian country had been 
taken, and every soldier killed. Close upon these tidings came the enemy himself. 
The Indian war-parties broke out of the woods like gangs of wolves, murdering, 
burning, and laying waste; while hundreds of terror-stricken families, abandon-
ing their homes, fled for refuge towards the older settlements, and all was misery 
and ruin" (494; see also 627, 637). Tellingly, the rhetoric Parkman, like virtually 
all the custodians of the American memory of the time, invariably uses to refer 
to Indian country is deeply inscribed by the Romans' inaugural identification of 
the barbarian with the (uncultivated) forest (silvestris: "savage," literally "of the 
woods  "To rescue [this history] from oblivion is the object of the fol-
lowing work. It aims to portray the American forest and the American Indian at 
the period when both received their final doom" (Parkman, preface to the first 
edition, 347). 
19. Caputo, Rumor of War, 213. Tellingly, however, as the last line of the 
quotation suggests, Caputo here, and in his agonized confessional narrative 
that articulates his disillusionment about the war, draws the wrong conclusion 
from his insight into the American public's amnesiac longing. Caputo's "auto-
biography" is more politically suggestive than the numerous other projects of 
that moment to "remember" the war by way of "eyewitness" accounts against 
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the American public's "ideologically induced" will to forget it. Nevertheless, it 
goes far to reinscribe that form of re-presentation epitomized by John Wayne's 
The Green Berets and the numerous personal narratives about the war published 
in the 1980s. See note 21 below. 
20. See William V. Spanos, The End of Education: Toward Posthumanism 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), especially the chapter titled 
"The Violence of Disinterestedness: A Genealogy of the Educational 'Reform' 
Initiative in the 1980s,"  
21. Bernard Edelman,  Dear America: Letters Home from Vietnam (New 
York: Pocket Books, 1985);  Santoli,  Everything We Had: An Oral His-
tory of the Vietnam War by Thirty-Three American Soldiers Who Fought It 
(New York: Random House, 1981) (the Ballantine paperback edition of this 
book had gone through twenty-one reprintings as of May 1988); Santoli,  To 
Bear Any Burden: The Vietnam War and Its Aftermath in the Words of Amer-
icans and Southeast Asians (New York: E. P. Button, 1985); Mark Baker,  
Nam: The Vietnam War in the Words of the Men and Women Who Fought 
There (New York: William Morrow, 1981); Wallace Terry,  Bloods: An Oral 
History of the Vietnam War by Black Veterans (New York: Ballantine Books, 
1984); Philip Caputo, A Rumor of War (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Win-
ston, 1977); and Ron Kovic, Born on the Fourth of July (New York: Pocket 
Books, 1977). The other Hollywood movies include the popular melodramatic 
action  starring Chuck Norris, Missing in Action (1984), Missing in Action 
II (1985), and Missing in Action III (1988). On the ideological stakes surround-
ing the MIA issue, see Bruce Franklin MIA, or Mythmaking in America (New 
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press,  and Elliot Gruner, Prisoners 
of Culture: Representing the Vietnam ROW (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers 
University Press, 1993). 
22. Santoli, Everything We Had, xvi; Santoli's emphasis. 
23. For a radically different, indeed, antithetical, version of this reversed mis 
en scene, in which the American soldier as Leatherstocking-figure fights a guer-
rilla war against his corrupted country, see Robert Stone's novel Dog Soldiers 
(New York: Penguin, 1987 [1974]). In this resonant "American" novel, the "er-
rand" of the idealist American frontier hero (Ray Hicks), who has been utterly 
disillusioned by the America that is conducting the war in Vietnam ("You can't 
blame us too much. We didn't know who we were till we got here," his friend 
says. "We thought we were something else" [57]), is reduced to drug running 
against a decadent America symbolized by a corrupt FBI agent and his criminal 
deputies. In a deliberately staged symbolic reversal of the westward American 
narrative, which now moves from the Vietnamese East to the American West, 
Stone brings the American "adventure" of this contemporary Natty Bumppo to 
its end in the southern California desert, where, in a shoot-out, he comes to 
understand himself as a Vietcong doing battle with the massive American war 
machine: 
I'm the little man in the boonies now, he thought. 
The thing would be to have one of their SG mortars. He was conceiv-
ing a passionate hatred for the truck — its bulk and mass — and for the 
man who sat inside it. 
The right side for a change. (296) 
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The Rambo trilogy thus could be understood as an ideological effort to revise 
Stone's earlier parodic representation of the Leatherstocking-figure by mak-
ing him the last American patriot: the saving remnant. As such, this alienated 
 becomes the  precursor of the emergent paramilitary 
movement that, adopting the imagery (minutemen, militia) of the American 
Revolution, represents the monolithic United States government as the betrayer 
of "America," and that figure's devastation of the town becomes the precur-
sor of the type of violence enacted by the Oklahoma City bombing. For a 
brilliant analysis of the "negative interpellation" that determines this reversal 
(and of which Rambo is a proleptic instance), see Donald Pease, "Negative In-
terpellations: From Oklahoma City to the Trilling-Matthiessen Transmission," 
boundary 2 23 (spring 1996): 1-33. 
24. For a powerful early cultural/psychological analysis of this perennial 
American archetype, see the chapter titled "The Metaphysics of Indian-hating," 
in Herman Melville, The Confidence-Man (Evanston,  Northwestern Univer-
sity Press and Newberry Library, 1984), 144-51. It is from this chapter that 
Richard Drinnon draws the title of his inaugural cultural study of America's 
genocidal Westward  Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-
Hating and Empire Building (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1980). 
25. Santoli, To Bear Any Burden, xviii; hereafter cited in the text as BAB. 
26. Reported by the New York Times, January 9, 1991. 
27. George Bush to a group of state legislators, reported in Newsweek  
March 11, 1991: "By God, we've kicked the Vietnam Syndrome once and for 
all" (30). The phrase was omnipresent in the discourse of the Bush adminis-
tration and of the media both before the American decision to go to war and 
after the war ended. See, for example, the issues of Time and Newsweek at that 
time. This post-Gulf War euphoria incumbent on the overcoming of the specter 
of Vietnam was not restricted to the media. For a representative "historical" 
version, see Mark Clodfelter, "Of Demons, Storms, and Thunder: A Preliminary 
Look at Vietnam's Impact on the Persian Gulf Air Campaign," Looking Back on 
the Vietnam War: A  Perspective on the Decisions, Combat, and Legacies, 
ed. William Head and Lawrence E. Grinter (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 
1993), 145-60. 
28. For extended critiques of this negative representation of the emergence 
of national self-questioning in the Vietnam decade and after, see William V. 
Spanos, "boundary 2 and the Polity of Interest: Humanism, the Center Else-
where, and Power," in On Humanism and the University I , special issue of 
boundary 2 12, no. 3 and 13, no. 1 (spring/fall 1984): 173-214; Spanos, "De-
struction and the Critique of Ideology: A Polemic Meditation on Marginal 
Discourse," in Repetitions: The Postmodern Occasion in Literature and Culture 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987), 277-313; and Spanos, 
End of Education, 243-44. 
29. See Lauren Barritz, Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led 
Us into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did (New York: William 
Morrow, 1985), 105. The latest version of this reactionary agenda to "forget" 
Vietnam in behalf of recuperating "our national pride" and the "promise" of 
America is articulated by the politically reformist American pragmatist Richard 
Rorty in his aptly titled Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-
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Century America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998): "One 
consequence of that disastrous war was a generation of Americans who sus-
pected that our country was unachievable — that the war not only could never 
be forgiven, but had shown us to be a nation conceived in sin, and irredeemable. 
This suspicion lingers. As long as it does, and as long as the American Left re-
mains incapable of national pride, our country will have only a cultural Left, 
not a political one"  
30. See William V. Spanos, "Rethinking 'Rethinking SUNY': The Costly Ide-
ology Informing 'Cost Efficiency,' " Crossings: A Counter-disciplinary Journal of 
Philosophical, Cultural, and Literary Studies 1 (spring 1997): 164-77. 
31. I am invoking here the rhetoric of Page duBois, Torture and Truth: 
The New Ancient World (New York: Routledge, 1991). In this provocative but 
quite unevenly argued book, duBois attempts to show, by way of analyzing a 
number of classical Greek texts (including Plato's), the absolute complicity of 
Western truth discourse (the quest for the concealed) with the practice of tor-
ture  Her book provides historical textual evidence for my claim that 
Occidental ontology — its reification of being (to Being) and its representation 
of the ineffable truth of being in terms of a violently forced movement from 
darkness into    its ultimate fulfillment in a willful practice of power 
epitomized by the phrase "search and destroy." Unfortunately, duBois's ideo-
logical agenda in this genealogical project is to implicate Martin Heidegger's 
"concept" of truth  with Nazi practice. As I understand it, Heideg-
ger's "truth" (a-letheia) constitutes an effort to free itself from a certain Platonic 
impulse in post-Socratic thinking that would reduce being to eidos (one taken 
over and codified by the Roman Veritas). Taking her point of departure from 
Victor Farias's Heidegger et  nazisme (1987), duBois, on the other hand, reads 
Heidegger's a-letheia as a continuation of Greek Platonism. Like many recent 
humanists who have grasped at the opportunity afforded by Farias's book to 
recuperate the ground humanism lost to postmodern theory since the Vietnam 
War, duBois thus misrepresents Heidegger's understanding of the relationship 
between thinking and political practice by viewing it within the traditionalist 
humanist problematic that restricts politics to the binary opposition between 
democracy and totalitarianism. This willful misreading of Heidegger's text is 
epitomized by duBois's failure to note that the Greek thinker Heidegger invokes 
above all to think being against a certain metaphysical Plato, the post-Socratics, 
and the Romans is the pre-Socratic Heraclitus: precisely the philosopher, accord-
ing to duBois, whose thought, in opposition to the "totalitarianism" of Plato's, 
lends itself to democratic practice. 
32. Following Hegel's modern interpreter Alexandre Kojeve, Francis Fuku-
yama, in fact, antedates the end of history to the Enlightenment, specifically to 
the Battle of Jena (1806). It is a "developmentalist" reading that allows him 
to represent the seventy-year hegemony of communism as an ancillary agent of 
liberal   a historical detour that, in its forceful immediacy ("at the 
time"), obscured the emergent larger historical pattern, retarding the recogni-
tion of the final triumph of liberal democracy: "The center of Kojeve's teaching 
was the startling assertion that Hegel had been essentially right, and that world 
history, for all the twists and turns it had taken in subsequent years, had effec-
tively ended in the year   this seemingly odd conclusion is the 
thought that the principles of liberty and equality that emerged from the French 
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Revolution, embodied in what Kojeve called the modern 'universal and homoge-
neous state,' represented the end point of human ideological evolution beyond 
which it was impossible to progress further. Kojeve was of course aware that 
there had been many bloody wars and revolutions in the years since 1806, but 
these he regarded as essentially an 'alignment of the provinces.' In other words, 
communism did not represent a higher stage than liberal democracy, it was part 
of the same stage of history that would eventually universalize the spread of lib-
erty and equality to all parts of the world. Though the Bolshevik and Chinese 
revolutions seemed like monumental events at the time, their only lasting effect 
would be to spread the already established principles of liberty and equality to 
formerly backward and oppressed peoples, and to force those countries of the 
developed world already living in accordance with such principles to implement 
them more completely" (Fukuyama, End of History, 66). The analogy with the 
fate of the actual history of the Vietnam War under the ruthless commanding eye 
of this Hegelian/Kojevian historiographic perspective should not be overlooked. 
33. Raymond Williams warned against this structuration of being quite 
some time ago in Marxism and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1977): "In the transition from Marx to Marxism, and then in the development 
of expository and didactic formulations, the words used in the original argu-
ments were projected, first, as if they were precise concepts, and second, as if 
they were descriptive terms for observable 'areas' of social life. The main sense 
of the words in the original arguments had been relational, but the popularity 
of the terms tended to indicate either (a) relatively enclosed categories or (b) 
relatively enclosed areas of activity. These were then correlated either tempo-
rally (first material production, then consciousness, then politics and culture) or 
in effect, forcing the metaphor, spatially (visible and distinguishable 'levels' or 
'layers' — politics and culture, then forms of consciousness, and so on down to 
the 'base'). The serious practical problems of method, which the original words 
had indicated, were then usually in effect bypassed by methods derived from a 
confidence, rooted in the popularity of the terms, in the relative enclosure of 
categories or areas expressed as 'the base,' 'the superstructure.' 
"It is then ironic to remember that the force of Marx's original criticism had 
been mainly directed against the separation of 'areas' of thought and activity (as 
in the separation of consciousness from material production) and against the re-
lated evacuation of specific   real human   by the imposition 
of abstract categories" (77-78). 
But Williams's warning against this separation and spatialization of "con-
scious existence," which is especially applicable to the analysis of the Vietnam 
War and the advent of the New World Order, has not been heeded — perhaps 
because it has not been   either by Marxists or New Historicists. 
34. Karl Marx, The German Ideology, Tart One, with Selections from Parts 
Two and Three, together with Marx's "Introduction to a Critique of Politi-
cal Economy," ed. C. J. Arthur (New York: International Publishers, 1977), 
47. Of course, Marx's rhetoric in The German Ideology circulates around the 
base/superstructure nexus and thus contributed massively to the eventual sun-
dering of this resonant oxymoron in the discourse of "Marxism." But his 
overdetermination of this rhetoric is motivated not by a Transcendental Sig-
 but by the historically specific circumstances of the German occasion, 
specifically the primacy of the (Young) Hegelians' "Word": their positing of 
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"consciousness" as external to and determinative of the "actual life-process" 
of men and women. 
35. John Hellman, American Myth and the Legacy of Vietnam (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986). The quotation is from a review of The Quiet 
American by A. J. Liebling in the Netv Yorker, April 7, 1956, 148-54. Some 
sense of the utter blindness of American intellectuals at that time to the ideo-
logical implications of Greene's satirization of the American national identity 
in the figure of   can be gleaned from the flippantly vacuous style 
and content of the following passage from this review: " I should perhaps ex-
plain here [after interrupting his account of the 'main incident of the book' (the 
'messy explosion in downtown Saigon') to tell his readers that he had decided 
to finish the novel in order to 'kill the two last deadly hours' of his flight to 
Idlewild so that he 'could give it to the hostess, a brunette from Rye, New 
York'] that the book begins with Pyle in the morgue. That is the big gag: A 
Quiet American. It then goes on to the events that led up to his arrival there. 
The trouble that starts immediately and keeps on happening is known techni-
cally as Who Cares?" (149). The massive pertinence that The Quiet American 
came to have in the United States, as its deepening involvement in Vietnam in-
creasingly exposed the abyssal gap between its self-representation and its actual 
practice, constitutes a  irony that should not be overlooked at this post-
Cold War conjuncture. The reviews of Greene's novel published by the American 
culture industry at the outset of America's intervention in Southeast Asia were 
intended to bury it. But this resonant text has risen from its grave to haunt its 
grave-diggers. 
36. Graham Greene, The Quiet American (New York: Penguin, 1977), 94-
95. 
37. Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the 
Human Sciences," in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1978), 279. 
38. Herman Rapaport, "Vietnam: The Thousand Plateaus," in The Six-
ties without Apologies, ed. Sohnya Sayres et al. (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1984), 138. 
39. Alan W. Watts's account of the Taoist wu-wei constitutes a remarkable 
verification of the analogy I am drawing: "[C]oupled with the doctrine of Tao 
is the teaching of wu-wei, the secret of mastering circumstances without assert-
ing oneself against  Actually it is the principle underlying  
the principle of yielding to an on-coming force in such a way that it is unable 
to harm you, and at the same time changing its direction by pushing it from 
behind instead of attempting to resist it from the front. Thus the skilled master 
of life never opposes things; he never yields to their full force and either pushes 
them slightly out of direct line or else moves them right round in the oppo-
site direction without ever encountering their direct opposition. This is to say, 
he treats them positively; he changes them by acceptance, by taking them into 
his confidence, never by flat denial. Perhaps wu-wei can best be understood by 
contrast with its opposite, yu-wei. The character for yu is composed of two sym-
 hand and   thus signifying the idea of clutching at the   as 
if it could be seized and possessed. But the moon eludes all attempts at grasp-
ing, and can never be held still in the sky anymore than circumstances can be 
prevented from changing by conscious striving. Therefore while yu is trying to 
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clutch what is elusive (and Life as Tao is essentially elusive)  is not only not 
clutching but also the positive acceptance of elusiveness and change.... It is the 
principle of controlling things by going along  them, of mastery through 
adaptation" {The Spirit of Zen: A Way of Life, Work, and Art in the Far East 
[New York: Grove Press, 1958], 37). I am indebted to Jeannette McVicker for 
alerting me to this analogy: "In martial arts, the point is to anticipate your en-
emy's move, and let it happen, because it is your enemy who is expending his 
energy. You let his energy put him into a position of vulnerability so that you 
can thus take advantage of it — to 'fight without violence.' Americans inter-
preted the Vietnamese insurgents' mode of fighting the war as feminine, passive, 
and cowardly weakness; rather, it was a subtle harmonizing strategy of great 
insight that utilized nature and the earth all directed toward the 'goal' of letting 
the Americans defeat themselves through their arrogant indifference to the land 
(Xa) and disrespect for 'the Way' " (letter, July 7, 1998). 
40. See Tom Englehardt, The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America 
and the Disillusioning of a Generation (New York: Basic Books, 1995). 
41. See the epigraph to this section from Martin Heidegger's "What Is Meta-
physics?" trans. R. F. C. Hull and Alan Crick, in Existence and Being, ed. 
Werner Brock (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1949), 336; see also Being and Time, 
trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 
1962), 231-32 and 393ff. It has been one of my abiding concerns as a literary 
critic to draw attention to the appropriatability of Heidegger's distinction be-
tween the dread that has no thing and the fear that has some thing as its object 
to the project of tracing the genealogy of the privileged status of narrative in 
the Western literary tradition back to the foundation of the idea of the Occi-
dent and demonstrating its complicity with the imperial will to power over the 
Other. See chapter 1 above. Here, I am extending this restricted focus to in-
clude its appropriatability to the genealogy of the metanarratives privileged by 
the Occident in general and America in particular. 
42. Caputo, Rumor of War, 107; hereafter cited in the text as RW. 
43. O'Brien, Going after Cacciato (New York: Dell, 1989 [1978]), 240; 
hereafter cited in the text as GC. 
44. As I suggested in chapter 2, the map, the sine qua non of the imperial 
project, is endemic to the anthropological (Enlightenment) phase of the onto-
theological tradition. Not accidentally, an acute awareness on the part of the 
American Military Mission of the utter ineffectuality of the map was pervasive 
in the discourse of the Vietnam War. One of the most consciously articulated 
instances of this awareness is to be found in John M . Del Vecchio's Melvillian 
The 13th Valley (New York: Bantam, 1982). In this novel the incommensurabil-
ity of the (Ahabian) narrative quest (to find and destroy an NVA headquarters 
and communications center) with the appended visual maps that represent its 
"progress" (toward the final catastrophe) becomes the structural principle of 
the narrative. Michael Herr's meditations on the Vietnam War in Dispatches 
are instigated by this destructive relation between the being of Vietnam and the 
imperial map: "I f dead ground could come back and haunt you the way dead 
people do, they'd have been able to mark my map [of Vietnam under French 
rule] current and burn the ones they'd been using since '64, but count on it, 
nothing like that was going to happen. It was late '67 now, even the most de-
tailed maps didn't reveal much anymore; reading them was like trying to read 
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the faces of the Vietnamese, and that was like trying to read the wind" (1; see 
also 92-93). 
45. Tim O'Brien, The Things They Carried (New York: Penguin, 1991), 
228-29; see also O'Brien, Going after Cacciato, 77. 
46. See also Caputo, Rumor of War, 55. 
47. Herr, Dispatches, 95. 
48. Del Vecchio, 13th Valley, 381. 
49. Gustav Hasford, The Short Timers (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 
73. 
50. To retrieve my discussion of the peripatetic Herodotus in the preceding 
chapter, this decentering and demolecularizing strategy of invisibility practiced 
by the Vietnamese insurgents is proleptically theorized in his remarkable ac-
count of the bafflement and eventual withdrawal of Darius's more formidable 
invading Persian army due to the guerrilla tactics of the nomadic (barbarian) 
Scythians, who lived on the margins of the oikoumene. Herodotus prefaces this 
account in the following way: "The Scythians, however, though in most respects 
I do not admire them, have managed one thing, and that the most important in 
human affairs, better than anyone else on the face of the earth: I mean their 
own preservation. For such is their manner of life that no one who invades 
their country can escape destruction, and if they wish to avoid engaging with 
an enemy, that enemy cannot possibly come to grips with them. A people with 
fortified towns, living, as Scythians do, in wagons which they take with them 
wherever they go, accustomed, one and all, to fight on horseback with bows and 
arrows, and dependent for their food not on agriculture but upon their cattle: 
how can such a people fail to defeat the attempts of an invader not only to sub-
due them, but even to make contact with them?" (The Histories, trans. Aubrey 
de Selincourt and A. R. Burn [Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1972], 286). 
For an extended analysis of Herodotus's account of the Scythians' defeat of the 
invading Persian army that focuses on this baffling nomadic strategy, see the 
aptly titled chapter "The Hunter Hunted: Poros and Aporia," in  Har-
 The Mirror of Herodotus: The Representation of the Other in the Writing 
of History, trans. Janet Lloyd (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 
34-60. 
51. The American strategy of attrition (the body count) was nothing more 
than an allotrope, indeed, the fulfillment of the trope informing the traditional 
European concept of warfare — that is, the table, which, to be effective, must 
reduce the differential otherness of the Other to calculative quantity: "Once 
the [casualty] reports were filed, I brought Colonel Wheeler's scoreboard up to 
date. Covered with acetate and divided into vertical and horizontal columns, the 
board hung behind the executive officer's desk, in the wood-framed tent where 
he and the colonel made their headquarters. The vertical columns were headed, 
from left to right,   DOW (died of wounds), NON-HOST,  
 and VC-POW. The horizontal columns were labeled with the numerical 
designations 1/3 for  Battalion. 3d Marines, 2/3 Battalion, and so forth. In 
the first four vertical columns were written the number of casualties a particu-
lar unit had suffered, in the last three the number it had inflicted on the enemy. 
After an action, I went into the colonel's quarters, erased the old figures and 
wrote in the new with a grease pencil. The colonel, an easy going man in most 
instances, was adamant about maintaining an accurate scoreboard: high-ranking 
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visitors from Danang and Saigon often dropped in unannounced to see how the 
regiment was performing. And the measures of a unit's performance in Vietnam 
were not the distances it had advanced or the numbers of victories it had won, 
but the number of enemy soldiers it had killed (the body count) and the propor-
tion between that number and the number of its own dead (the kill ratio). The 
scoreboard thus allowed the colonel to keep track of the battalions and compa-
nies under his command and, quickly and crisply, to rattle off impressive figures 
to visiting dignitaries. My unsung task in that statistical war was to do the arith-
metic. If I had been an agent of death as a platoon leader, as a staff officer I was 
death's bookkeeper" (Caputo, Rumor of War, 159-60). 
52. Herr, Dispatches, 71. 
53. John Duffet, Against the Crime of Silence: Proceedings of the Inter-
national War Crimes Tribunal, with an introduction by Bertrand Russell and a 
preface by Noam Chomsky (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968). The Amer-
ican Mission did not, needless to say, represent this undiscriminating military 
initiative in terms of genocide. It felt, characteristically, that "saving Vietnam" 
from communist totalitarianism at any cost was logically justified by the uni-
versal principles of liberal democracy. Only when critics of the war such as 
Jean-Paul Sartre and Bertrand Russell began referring to America's conduct of 
the war as genocidal did the "gap" between the ontological principles justifying 
the intervention and the indiscriminate violence of America's conduct of the war 
begin to manifest itself. It was only after these critics began comparing Amer-
ican aggression in Vietnam to Nazi genocide that the word came to assume 
a resonant significance in the debates over the question of the culpability of 
those conducting the war in Vietnam. (See, for  General Telford Taylor, 
Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy [Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 
1970].) It was, I suggest, the specter of that terrible contradiction that brought 
the war to its shuddering end. And it is the disclosure of the relationship be-
tween the two that the official memory has tried to forget. It is this relationship 
that a posthumanist discourse has to remember. 
54. Television interview, quoted in  de Antonio's documentary video, 
The Day of the Pig (1968). Later in the interview, in response to a question 
about the quality of the "Vietcong" soldier, Clark adds, "Oh, there's no question 
about it. They're willing to die readily, as all Orientals are. And their lead-
ers will sacrifice them and we won't sacrifice ours." This typically grotesque 
racist/political view of the Asian Other was entirely shared by General Curtis 
Lemay: "Our every American instinct makes us want to jump in with both feet 
to get an unpleasant job over with as soon as possible. But traditional Orien-
tal patience makes them willing to carry on the struggle into generation after 
generation if necessary. We're fighting a war over there with a commodity most 
precious to us and held far more cheaply by the enemy: the lives of men." What 
is especially telling is that this formulaic ideological relay was not restricted to 
politically reactionary militarists, then euphemistically called "hawks." It was 
also essential to the "liberal" discourse of all-too-many so-called liberal doves. 
Thus, for example, Tounsend Hoopes, the undersecretary of the Air Force who 
became a leading advocate of withdrawal after the Tet Offensive, wrote: "We 
believe the enemy can be forced to be 'reasonable,' i.e., to compromise or even 
capitulate, because we assume he wants to avoid pain, death, and material de-
struction. We assume that if these are inflicted on him with increasing  
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then at some point in the process he will want to stop suffering. Ours is a plausi-
ble   for those who are rich, who love life and fear pain. But happiness, 
wealth, and power are expectations that constitute a dimension far beyond the 
experience, and probably beyond the emotional comprehension, of the Asian 
poor." To this Noam Chomsky replies: "Hoopes does not tell us how he knows 
that the Asian poor do not love life or fear pain, or that happiness is probably 
beyond their emotional comprehension. But he does go on to explain how 'ide-
ologues in Asia' make use of these characteristics of the Asian hordes. Their 
strategy is to convert 'Asia's capacity for endurance in suffering into an instru-
ment for exploiting a basic vulnerability of the Christian West.' They do this 
by inviting the West 'to carry its strategic logic to the final conclusion, which is 
genocide....' At that point we hesitate, for, remembering Hitler and Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, we realize anew that genocide is a terrible burden to bear. Thus 
by their willingness to die, the Asian hordes, who do not love life, who fear no 
pain and cannot conceive of happiness, exploit our basic weakness — our Chris-
tian values which make us reluctant to bear the burden of genocide, the final 
conclusion of our strategic logic. Is it really possible to read these passages with-
out being stunned by their crudity and callousness?" ("On War Crimes," in At 
War with Asia [New York: Pantheon, 1970], 298-99). 
55. Frances FitzGerald, Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans 
in Vietnam (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 433. 
56. Herr, Dispatches, 106-7. Herr is acutely conscious of both the polyva-
lent leveling power of the Mission's "American" narrative and its contradictory 
consequences: the terrible absurdity of its beginning-middle-end logic. His ac-
count of what the American Mission and the culture industry in the United 
States represented as a Dien Bien Phu overlaid with the heroic image of the 
Alamo and called "The Battle of Khe Sanh" or "The Siege of Khe Sanh" ends as 
follows: "A token American force was kept at Khe Sanh for the next month, and 
the Marines went back to patrolling the hills, as they had done a year before. A 
great many people wanted to know how the Khe Sanh Combat Base could have 
been the Western Anchor of our Defense [as General Westmoreland has narra-
tivized the occasion] one month and a worthless piece of ground the next, and 
they were simply told that the situation had changed. A lot of people suspected 
that some kind of secret deal had been made with the North; activity along the 
DMZ all but stopped after Khe Sanh was abandoned. The Mission called it a 
victory, and General Westmoreland said that it had been 'a Dien Bien Phu in re-
verse' " (163). I made this point about the narrative-obsessed American structure 
of consciousness in an essay written during the Vietnam War titled "The Detec-
tive and the Boundary: Some Notes on the Postmodern Literary Imagination," 
boundary 1 1, no. 1 (fall 1972): 147-68; reprinted in Repetitions, 13-49, and 
in Early Postmodernism: Foundational Essays, ed. Paul Bove (Durham, N.C.: 
Duke University Press, 1995), 17-39. There, I invoked the representation by 
the then secretary of defense in the Nixon administration, Melvin Laird, of the 
well-"rehearsed" (New York Times) and "perfectly executed" (Time) Ameri-
can rescue mission staged against the Son Tay prisoner of war camp in North 
Vietnam, which ended in finding no one there: "Despite this mockery 'of our 
contrived finalities' [Iris Murdoch], these revelatory glimpses into the horror, 
the secretary,... like the detective in his "Retrospective,' was driven to declare 
reiteratively in the aftermath that the Son Tay affair was a successfully com-
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pleted operation. It is this metamorphosis of the absurd into manageable object, 
into fulfilled objective, into an accomplishment — this deus ex machina, as it 
  that is especially revealing. For the obvious incommensurability between 
the assertion of successful completion and the absurd and dreadful non-end con-
stitutes a measure of the intensity of the need that the power complex and the 
people that depend on it feel for definite conclusions. Returning to the ontolog-
ical level, it is a measure of modern Western man's inscribed need to take hold 
of the Nothing that, despite or perhaps because of his technic, is crowding in 
on him" (165). 
57. Frank Lentricchia, Ariel and the Police: Michel Foucault, William James, 
Wallace Stevens (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 20-21. 
58. This postmodern literary genre, I suggest, was, in part, instigated by the 
Vietnam War or related modern wars bearing witness to the wholesale slaughter 
of the "criminal" Others unleased in the name of the West's self-appointed task 
to win their hearts and minds. 
59. See especially Donald E. Pease, Visionary Compacts: American Renais-
sance Writing in Cultural Context (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1987); and Pease, "New Americanists: Revisionary Interventions in the Canon," 
in Pease, ed., Netv Americanists, a special issue of boundary 2 17 (spring 1990): 
1-37. 
60. Herman Melville, Moby-Dick or The Whale, ed. Harrison Hayford, 
Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle (Evanston,  Northwestern Univer-
sity Press and the Newberry Library),  Melville's insight into this productive 
relay between a  ontology that reduces "all" to one (monos) and 
an obliterating practice taking the form of a technological weapon that is iden-
tified metaphorically with the human heart (see the passage below from Philip 
Caputo's Rumor of War) is not accidental. This is made clear by the fact that 
Melville repeats and amplifies this insight later in the chapter: "Ahab's full lu-
nacy subsided not, but deepeningly contracted; like the unabated Hudson, when 
that noble Northman flows narrowly, but unfathomably through the Highland 
gorge. But, as in his narrow-flowing monomania, not one jot of Ahab's broad 
madness had been left behind; so in that broad madness, not one jot of his great 
natural intellect had perished. That before living agent, now became the living 
instrument. If such a furious trope may stand, his special lunacy stormed his 
general sanity, and carried it, and turned all its concentrated cannon upon its 
own mad mark; so that far from having lost his strength, Ahab, to that one 
end, did now possess a thousand fold more potency than ever he had sanely 
brought to bear upon any one reasonable object" (185). For a full amplification 
of this reading of Melville's novel, see William V. Spanos, The Errant Art of 
Moby-Dick: The Canon, the Cold War, and the Struggle for American Studies 
(Durham,  Duke University Press, 1995). In working out the continuity of 
American history from the Puritans' ontologicaliy justified New Adamic errand 
in the wilderness through the devastating expansionism legitimated by Manifest 
Destiny to the  practice of "America" in Vietnam, I have re-
lied heavily on Sacvan Bercovitch's important, if also disablingly flawed,  
The American Jeremiad; John Hellman's American Myth, which extends Bercov-
itch's analysis of American cultural history to the Vietnam period; and Richard 
Drinnon, Facing West. 
61. See also 301. That this symptomatic testimony is at the heart of Caputo's 
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memoir is made clear by his summation of its progress in the prologue: "At 
times, the comradeship that was the war's only redeeming quality caused some 
of its worst crimes — acts of retribution for friends who had been killed. Some 
men could not withstand the stress of guerrilla-fighting: the hair-trigger alertness 
constantly demanded of them, the feeling that the enemy was everywhere, the 
inability to distinguish civilians from combatants created emotional pressures 
which built to such a point that a trivial provocation could make these men 
explode with the blind destructiveness of a mortar shell" (xix). 
62. The violence inflicted on the truth in the name of (American) truth by the 
military court martial is epitomized by the ironies informing the defense strategy 
of Caputo's lawyer: 
" I don't want you to get bitter. I want you to do well on the stand today. I 
can tell you that I admire you for the way you've borne up under all this. 
Don't mess it up now. Really, I would've cracked long ago." 
"Well, I don't break, Jim. That's one thing I'm not going to do. I broke 
once and I'm never going to break again." 
"Hell, when did you ever break?" 
"That night. The night I sent those guys out there. I just cracked. I 
couldn't take it anymore. I was frustrated as hell and scared. If I hadn't 
broken, I would've never sent those guys out." 
"Oh, that. We've been over that a dozen times. No drama, okay? This 
is the real world. We've been over that, over and over. You told them 
to capture those Vietnamese and to kill them if they had to. You didn't 
order an assassination. That's what you'll say on the stand and you'll say 
it because it's the truth." [Rumor of War, 307) 
63. Herr, Dispatches, 2. 
64. The specter of the genocide of the natives of North America and of the 
abduction and enslavement of millions of Africans has, of course, haunted the 
Occidental epistemic memory ever since the period of the Enlightenment, the pe-
riod in which the achievement of global domination by the West is represented 
simultaneously as its moral triumph. But these specters have been kept at bay by 
the West's (especially America's) interpretation of these horrors as aberrations in 
the epistemic logic of the Occident that have been corrected. Similarly, it could 
be said that the epistemic break I am attributing to the period of the Vietnam 
War, in fact, occurred earlier in this century. I am referring to World War I I , 
when Nazi Germany called the differential nothing that allegedly threatened 
the identity and peace of Europe "the Jews" and, in the name of Europe and 
according to its logic, undertook "the final solution": the systematic extermina-
tion of this Other — spectral — people. As Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe has said: 
"In the Auschwitz apocalypse, it was nothing less than the West, in its essence, 
that revealed itself — and that continues, ever since to reveal itself" [Heidegger, 
Art and Politics, trans. Chris Turner [London: Blackwell, 1990], 35). But be-
cause the other Western democratic nations — Great Britain, France, the United 
  were allied against fascist Germany in what they represented as a just 
war being fought in the name of the fundamentally benign principles of Western 
civilization, this epochal revelation was occluded until it exploded into view as 
unmistakable in the course of the Vietnam War, that is, when the logic of lib-
eral democracy ended in a genocidal practice that, according to many serious 
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thinkers at the time, was in essence the same as the genocidal practice enabled 
by the logic of German Nazism. 
65. Fukuyama, End of History, 45. It is not my concern in this essay to 
specify what the end-of-history discourse means by "liberal democracy." It will 
suffice, paraphrasing Fukuyama's representative definition, that it involves the 
integral relationship between the "liberal" rational drive to satisfy material de-
sires (capitalism) and the "aristocratic" emotional drive for recognition (thymos) 
(a relationship in which Fukuyama would give more weight to the aristocratic 
megalothymia in order to counter the enervating effect of liberal equalitarian 
isothytnia) and that this definition itself poses problems that preclude easy as-
sent. What does concern me   in the context of my retrieval of the 
history of America's intervention in Vietnam — is where Fukuyama locates this 
political formation: namely, at a moment of modern history that, in being repre-
sented as "the end of the Cold War" or the "triumph of liberal democracy over 
communism," occludes a history the witness of which would   disclose 
the delegitimating aporia in — such a triumphal representation. 
66. I am thinking of Milan Kundera's The Book of Laughter and For-
getting, trans. Michael Henry Helm (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), in 
which he foregrounds the literal practice of this tactic of forgetful remember-
ing in communist Czechoslovakia enabled by a totalizing Universal History: "In 
February 1948, Communist leader Klement Gottwald stepped out on the bal-
cony of a Baroque palace in Prague to address the hundreds of thousands of 
his fellow citizens packed into Old Town Square. It was a crucial moment in 
Czech history — a fateful moment of the kind that occurs once or twice in a 
millennium. 
"Gottwald was flanked by his comrades, with dementis standing next to 
him. There were snow flurries, it was cold, and Gottwald was bareheaded. The 
solicitous dementis took off his own fur cap and set it on Gottwald's head. 
"The Party propaganda section put out hundreds of thousands of copies of a 
photograph of that balcony with Gottwald, a fur cap on his head and comrades 
at his side, speaking to the nation. On that balcony the history of Commu-
nist Czechoslovakia was born. Every child knew that photograph from posters, 
schoolbooks, and museums. 
"Four years later Clementis was charged with treason and hanged. The pro-
paganda section immediately airbrushed him out of history and, obviously, out 
of all the photographs as well. Ever since, Gottwald has stood on the balcony 
alone. Where Clementis once stood, there is only bare palace wall. All that 
remains of Clementis is the cap on Gottwald's head" (1). 
67. Noam Chomsky, Deterring Democracy (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1992). 
68. Herr, Dispatches, 219. 
69. Ibid., 50. "Straight history, auto-revised history, history without handles, 
for all the books and articles and white papers, all the talk and the miles of 
film, something wasn't answered, it wasn't even asked. We were back-grounded, 
deep, but when the background started sliding forward not a single life was 
saved by the information. The thing had transmitted too much energy, it heated 
up too hot, hiding low under the fact-figure crossfire there was a secret his-
tory, and not a lot of people felt like running in there to bring it out" (ibid., 
49-50). 
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